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DETERMINACY, OBJECTIVITY, AND AUTHORITY
JULES L. COLEMANt

BRlAN LErIERJ
Since the 1970s, analytic jurisprudence has been under attack
from what has come to be known as the Critical Legal Studies
("CLS") movement. CLS has been joined in this attack by proponents of FeministJurisprudence, and, most recently, by proponents
of Critical Race Theory. When the battle lines are drawn in this
way, the importance of the distinctions between the Natural Law
and Positivist traditions are easily missed. Whatever distinguishes
Hart from Dworkin, and both from Lon Fuller, matters very little
from this point of view, as compared to what (theoretically at least)
unites them, and that, according to its critics, is a commitment to
the ideals of "legal liberalism."
If Joseph Singer's The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory1 is representative of the CLS critique, liberalism is committed to the law being determinate, objective, and neutral. According
to CLS, the problem with liberalism is that none of these ideals
obtain in legal practice. Law is neither determinate, objective, nor
neutral.2
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candidate, University of Michigan; J.D. 1987, University of Michigan.
'Joseph W. Singer, The Playerand the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theoy, 94 YALE
L.J. 1 (1984).
2 Critical Race Theorists have been especially critical of law's claim to objectivity.
See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and RacialPolitics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609,1611 (1988) (noting that many scholars have identified the "objective"
stance as distinctively white and male);John 0. Calmore, CriticalRace Theory, Archie
Shepp, and FireMusic: Securingand Authentic IntellectualLife in a Multicultural World,
65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2162 n.107 (1992) ("[C]ritical race theory unmasks certain
themes that dominate mainstream legal disclosure, such as formal equality,
individualized opportunity, neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy.");
Anthony E. Cook, Beyond CriticalLegal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 992 (1990) (noting "disproven values
of neutrality and objectivity"); Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race Reform, andRetrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV 1331,
1341 (1988) (questioning Thomas Sowell's "expectations that he will eventually
(549)
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Although liberalism is sometimes associated with neutrality
regarding alternative conceptions of the good,' and less frequently
with forms of neutral dialogue, 4 the status of neutrality as a
defining characteristic of liberalism is quite contestable-even among
liberals.' Liberalism is a political philosophy built on the premise
that authorities often govern in the face of a plurality of conceptions
of the good. Legitimate authority must respect and respond to
pluralism, and while being neutral among divergent conceptions of
the good is one way of doing so, it is neither the only way nor the
uniquely liberal way. Let us, then, set aside the question of whether
liberal legal institutions are neutral in a suitable way, and focus
instead on the claim that legal authority presupposes or requires
that the outcomes of legal disputes be determinate and the legal
facts to which judicial opinions refer be objective.
We sympathize with many of the substantive concerns Grits,
Feminists, and Critical Race Theorists have expressed about existing
legal practices. We have two problems with the prevailing critique,
however. First, and of most immediate concern, the arguments
against determinacy and objectivity are unsound. Second, the
prevailing critique often misunderstands the nature of philosophic
argument and the manner in which philosophical theories bear on
our understanding and evaluation of legal practice, and on legal

identify some determinate, clearly discernible version of [the] law"); Richard Delgado,
The Inward Turn in OutsiderJurisprudence,34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 748 (1993)
(reflecting on observation that "feminism and Critical Race Theory are defined by a
commitment to the interests of people of color and women, by rejection of
abstraction and dispassionate 'objectivity'"); Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing An Essay
on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 813, 814 (1992) (arguing that powerful parties prefer
"objective" to "subjective" standards); Richard Delgado, StorytellingforOppositionists
and Others: A Pleafor Narrative,87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2441 (1989) ("Implying that
objective, correct answers can be given to legal questions ... obscures the moral and
political value judgments that lie at the heart of any legal inquiry."); Patricia J.
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Idealsfrom DeconstructedRights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404 (1987) (speculating that rights discourse may prove
"contradictory, indeterminate, reified and marginally decisive"). But see Mari J.
Matsuda, PragmatismModified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.
1763, 1769 (1990) (noting "contradiction between the critique of objectivity and the
critique of present injustice ... well known to ...

critical race theorists"); Sympo-

sium, Minority Critiques of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 297 (1987); Veronica Gentilli, Comment, A Double Challengefor CriticalRace
Scholars: The Moral Context, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2361, 2366 (1992) (arguing that
Critical Race Theory is committed ultimately to a form of moral realism).
3 See e.g., RONALD DwORXIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xiv (1977);JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OFJUSTICE 136-42 (1972).
4 See BRUCE A. ACIKERMAN, SOCiALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 357-59 (1980).
5 SeeJOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALrY OF FREEDOM 113-14 (1986).
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practice itself. It appears to be essential to the critique that
substantive problems with liberal legal regimes are either problems
in the "philosophy of liberalism," or are otherwise connected with

"liberal philosophy" because liberal practice and philosophy are
somehow inseparable.6 Thus, some critics have suggested that the

problem with liberalism (and why it is an enemy of women, for
example) is its commitment to abstraction and the correspondence
theory of truth.7 Others have claimed that the problem is essentialism.8 The most prevalent confusion is the identification of liberal
theory with epistemological foundationalism.' Then, citing Rorty,
Kuhn, and Wittgenstein as if they were citing a holding in an
unanimous Supreme Court decision, critics are satisfied to reject
6

Ironically, the same views we are concerned with rejecting here enjoyed a certain
currency in Germany in the later stages of the first wave of Hegelianism in the 1830s
and 1840s. Indeed, such views were lampooned by Marx and Engels in 1845-46. See
Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The German Ideology: Part I, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 146 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). It is a curious feature of the
intellectual history of CLS that it should have revived-apparently unselfconsciouslythe very neo-Hegelian critical themes that had been ridiculed by Marx and Engels
more than a century ago. For a further discussion, see infra note 13.
" See, e.g., Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of FeministJurisprudence:An Essay, 95 YALE
L.J. 1373, 1377 (1986) ("The philosophical basis of [the liberal] approach is 'abstract
universality.' ... Underlying this approach is the correspondence theory of truth
See, e.g., Marie Ashe, Inventing Choreographies: Feminism and Deconstruction, 90
COLuM. L. REV. 1123, 1132 (1990) (reviewing ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BoDy
AND THE LAw (1988), which criticizes MacKinnon's "essentialist error"); Drucilla
Cornell, Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon's
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 100 YALE L.J. 2247, 2264 (1991) (claiming that
MacKinnon "remains a specific kind of essentialist"); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 591 (1990) (contending
that "[d]espite its power, MacKinnon's dominance theory is flawed by its essentialism"); Allan C. Hutchinson, InessentiallySpeaking (Is There PoliticsAfter Postmodernism?),
89 MICH. L. REv. 1549, 1560 (1991) (reviewing MARTHA MiNOw, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE (1990), and observing"essentialist leanings" ofMacKinnon's "standpoint
epistemology"); Catherine A. MacKinnon, From Practiceto Theory, or What is a White
Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 18-22 (1991) (responding to gender
essentialism critiques); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abductionfrom the Seraglio: Feminist
Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REv. 109, 193 (1991) (charging
MacKinnon with "external essentialist understanding of woman's nature");Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary
FeministJurisprudence,75 IowA L. REv. 1135, 1149 n.33 (1990) (agreeing with Robin
West that "there seems to be an underlying unadmitted strain of essentialism running
through MacKinnon's work").
9
See Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Themy, 42 STAN. L. REv. 639
(1990) (criticizing antifoundationalist denials of a concept of theory); Steven L.
Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, MetaphoricReasoning andthe CognitiveStakesforLaw,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
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foundationalism, the possibility of objective epistemology, and
liberalism all in one fell swoop.
Foundationalism, however, is only one of many possible
epistemologies of justified belief, and not one currently favored.'
The correspondence theory of truth is simply one of many alternative accounts of the nature of truth, and a fairly controversial one
at that." Truth itself can hardly be the enemy. Remarks like these
seriously misunderstand philosophy and its relationships to both
legal theory and practice.
Worse, to think that anything of
substance hangs on a semantic, metaphysical, epistemological, or
other philosophical thesis may well be counterproductive to the
desirable goals of righting substantive wrongs and improving
2
people's lives'
0 There have been at least two different foundationalist traditions in epistemology: Cartesian foundationalism and logical empiricism. Foundationalism (roughly) is
the view that beliefs are ultimatelyjustified only if they rest on beliefs that themselves
are notjustified by appeal to yet other beliefs. Understood narrowly, foundationalism
is associated with the view that those beliefs that are notjustified by yet other beliefs
are themselves indubitable or otherwise certain. In the Cartesian tradition, the
foundation is the belief that "I think, therefore I am." In the logical empiricist
tradition, ultimate beliefs are normally associated with reports of sensory experience,
e.g., "I am now being appeared to greenly." Neither of the narrower forms of
foundationalism have been favored in philosophy at least since the publication in the
1950s of W.V. Quine's Two Dogmas in Empiricism. See Willard V.0. Quine, Two
Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 (3d ed. 1980); see also
Wilfred Sellars, Empiricism andthe Philosophyof the Mind, in SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND
REALITY 127-56 (1963). Richard Rorty popularized these Quinean and Sellarsian
themes in Philosophy and the MirrorofNature. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND
THE MIRROR OF NATURE 170-209 (1980).
" See, e.g., Donald Davidson, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, in TRUTH
AND INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DONALD DAVIDSON 307,
307-10 (Ernest LePore ed., 1986) (favoring coherence theory of truth over
correspondence theory of truth); Donald Davidson, The Structureand Contentof Truth,
87J. PHIL. 279, 301-05 (1990) (same).
12 This point was put well enough some 150 years ago by two writers whose
credentials on the political left are, we imagine, still unimpeachable:
Since [the Crits] consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the
products of consciousness.. as the real chains of men... it is evident that
[the Crits] have to fight only against these illusions of the consciousness.
Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings,
their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, [the
Crits] logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present
consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of
removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts
to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e., to recognize it by
means of another interpretation.... They forget, however, that to these
phrases [constituting the old interpretation] they themselves are only
opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real
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Phrases like "legal liberalism" have found their way into modem
jurisprudence, but do little to clarify the underlying issues. There
is no such thing as a "liberal philosophy," that is, an all-encompassing philosophy that includes, among other things, a distinct
metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, meta- and
normative ethics. Some liberals are metaphysical realists, others are
antirealists. Some are epistemic coherentists, others are externalists. Some are ethical deontologists, others are consequentialists.
And so on.
The same can be said about liberal jurisprudence. No analytic
jurisprude-not Dworkin, not Hart, not Fuller, not Raz, nor anyone
else-has ever referred to his or her jurisprudence as "liberal." This
is so in spite of the fact that Dworkin, Hart, and Raz are arguably
among the most important figures in political liberalism of the last
half of this century.
We will do two things in this Article. First we will consider and
reject certain arguments about determinacy and objectivity. Second,
we will get the debate back on the right track by eradicating several
confusing conflations of ideas and concepts. It would be a mistake,
however, to read us as being concerned primarily with responding
to liberalism's critics. Therefore, rather than arguing that liberalism's critics have failed to show that liberal political philosophy is
committed to legal determinacy, we will ask whether any of the deep
commitments of liberalism require that the outcomes of legal
disputes be determinate. In doing so, we hope to say something
fresh about what determinacy consists of, as well as about its
connection to predictability, stability, and the possibility of
democratic rule. Similarly, rather than arguing that its critics have
failed to establish liberalism's commitment to objectivity, we will
argue that liberalism is committed to objectivity and that our
ordinary understanding of judicial practice presupposes a form of
metaphysical objectivity with respect to legal facts. In making good
on those claims, we distinguish among a number of senses of
objectivity, introduce a new conception of it, and argue for its
coherence and its plausibility as an account of the kind of objectivity
presupposed by our legal practices.

existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world.
Marx & Engels, supra note 6, at 149. There are obvious emendations to the text
above. We do not mean to suggest that this passage is applicable to all the writings
associated with CLS. Still, it is strikingly apt with respect to some of the best known

CLS work.
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Understood in this way, the criticisms of liberalism presented by
Crits, Critical Race Theorists, and Feminists (among others) will be
employed largely as a springboard to a wider discussion of determinacy and objectivity in their relationship to liberal political theory
and the legitimacy of legal authority.
We begin by drawing some simple but important distinctions.
Initially, there are political and legal institutions on the one hand,
and there are philosophical, analytic, and normative theories about
these institutions on the other. With respect to philosophical
theories, we can distinguish the analytic from the normative.
Analytic theories offer accounts of human practices, particularly
their theoretical and conceptual commitments.'" The claim that
philosophical theories are accounts of human practices might
suggest that they are largely descriptive, that philosophy is really a
branch of sociology, that metaphysics or philosophy of science is
really something like a sociology of science, that epistemology is
really sociology of knowledge, and so on.
Philosophical accounts are not mere descriptions, however.
They are contestable conceptions or characterizations of practices
and the concepts central to them. They provide analyses, not
reports. 14 They are pictures of our practices, windows through
which we view the practices of making and defending moral
judgments, carrying on scientific inquiry, making and sustaining
claims to knowledge, and so on.
Not all philosophical theories seek to explain or provide an
understanding of the theoretical and conceptual commitments of
human practices. Some are normative. Instead of illuminating the
conceptual or theoretical commitments of our practices, normative
theories set out the conditions under which certain practices and
institutions could be justified or defended. Though analytic and
15 Problems in a philosophical theory do not provide a reason for rejecting the
practice it is designed to illuminate. By the same token, the moral undesirability of
a practice is not a reason for rejecting the best philosophical account of it.
14A report presupposes a well-defined or understood object. This is not true of
all philosophical accounts, .especially metaphysical ones, which are themselves
accounts of the objects of understanding. A philosophical account, moreover,
illuminates a practice from a point of view, in the light of certain interests or goals.
Furthermore, arguments on behalf of one kind of philosophical account, say, a
metaphysical theory, may point out how well that account fits with philosophical
accounts of other practices, say, with more settled accounts of our linguistic and
epistemic practices. Many of the considerations that support aphilosophical account
have little to do with the accuracy of the account, which would not be the case were
philosophical theories primarily reports.
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normative theories differ in their purposes, they are not always
unconnected. As the following example illustrates, certain analytic
theories have normative dimensions.
A philosophy of language provides an account of the conceptual
and theoretical commitments of our linguistic practices, the central
aspect of which is the ascription of meaning. As part of the practice
of ascribing meaning to words and sentences, we intend that the
meaning of the word or sentence serve to constrainthe uses to which
the word or sentence can be put. Linguistic constraint is a

normative concept; thus, analysis of meaning will be partially
normative, setting out the conditions of justifiable use of words or

sentences.

Accordingly, an account of meaning that focused

entirely on the history of the use of a term would fail because it
could not explain the sense in which the meaning was intended, not
merely to describe customary practice, but to constrain future
use.

15

So we can distinguish between legal and political practices on
the one hand and philosophical theories of those practices on the
other. Similarly, we can distinguish between analytic and normative
theories of those practices. The former illuminate the practice,
especially its theoretical and conceptual presuppositions and
commitments by providing analyses of the concepts implicated or
presupposed by them. The latter set out justification conditions,
that is, criteria that must be satisfied if a political practice or
institution is to be defensible, worthy of our allegiance, or otherwise
16
morally acceptable.
15 For a further discussion of the normative aspects of meaning, see infra part
il.A.2, discussing Kripkenstein's and Wright's rejection of realist semantics. There
are normative dimensions tojurisprudential theories as well. In this regard, consider
Ronald Dworkin's account ofadjudication. His view is that in interpreting legal texts,
judges are committed to seeing the law in its best light; that means that they are
committed to seeing it as normatively defensible in a certain way. Thus, his view is
that there is a normative or aspirational dimension of adjudication. See DWORKIN,
supra note 3, at vii-viii ("A general theory of law must be normative as well as
conceptual.... It must have a theory... of adjudication... [that views] normative
questions of law from the standpoint[] of... a judge....").
Sometimes his critics charge Dworkin with confusing normative with descriptive
jurisprudence, but they misunderstand his project. Like positivism, Dworkin's is not
a normative jurisprudence; it is an analytic jurisprudence that claims that part of the
practice being illuminated by the theory is normative. Judges share a commitment
to seeing the law as prima fade defensible, as justifiably enforceable by the use of
coercive means. The important point for our purposes is that the aspirational
component is an element of the practice, not a statement of the conditions under
which adjudication could be justified.
16The distinction between analytic and normative theories may seem artificial in
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Where does the term "liberalism" fit into these categories?
Liberalism can refer both to a set of institutions and political and
legal practices and to a normative philosophical theory of the
conditions that must be satisfied in order that certain aspects of our
practices, e.g., adjudication or coercion, can be justified.
To which of these categories does jurisprudence apply? It is
plainly not a political or legal practice or institution. For the most
part, jurisprudence is an analytic theory about certain legal
practices. A distinction exists as well between particular and
general analyticjurisprudence. Particularjurisprudence provides an

another way as well. We say that analytic theories offer accounts of our practices,
whereas normative theories set out justification conditions. But, of course, that just
means that there is a practice ofjustification-indeed, there are many practices of
justification. If philosophical theories provide accounts of our practices, we would
expect there to be accounts of ourjustificatory practices. Different theories will apply
to differentjustificatory practices. A theory about the nature of politicaljustification
may not coincide with a theory about the nature ofjustification in legal argument.
Is it part of the practice of political justification that the norms that set forth the
conditions under which authority is to be justified must themselves transcend the
practices of the community, or might they be embedded in some ways within the
practices of the community? Some have thought that it is part of our practice of
political justification that the norms of justification be universal and practicetranscendent. Recently, however, liberal political theory has focused on the possibility
of understanding our practices of justification differently; that, for example,
justification begins with certain norms and practices that at a certain level of
abstraction can be seen to be embedded in a particular community; thai, moreover,
justification is particular to communities of a particular type and need not be
universal. According to John Rawls,
[Political liberalism] does not criticize... any particular theory of the truth
of moraljudgments.... [I]t simply supposes thatjudgments... are made
from the point of view of some comprehensive moral doctrine .... Which
moral judgments are true, all things considered, is not a matter for political
liberalism, as it approaches all questions from within its own limited point
of view.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xix-xx (1993). As one important consequence,

this trend in political philosophy undermines the very standard, oft-heard objection
that because we are always situated in a particular time and place, we cannot have a
view of the matter that transcends our "positionality." Because we cannot transcend
our position, the objection continues, we cannot provide justifications that are
objective. All ourjustifications merely reflect our positions (our contingency) and do
so while hiding behind a mask of objectivity. In the first place, it may be no part of
our practice of justification that justification proceed from an archimedean point.
Second, there are a variety of senses of objectivity-as we explore below-that do not
presuppose a position outside human practices altogether. Justification can rely on
norms that are constitutive of practices, not external to them. And the mere fact that
such practices or norms have a causal history or explanation does not entail that they
lackjustificatory force. To assume otherwise is to assume, in effect, thatjustification
requires a view from nowhere.
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account of the legal practice of a particular community; general
jurisprudence provides an account of what, if anything, is true of

the concept of law, of legal practice everywhere. Typically, analytic
jurisprudence has an important normative component: It aims to
set out the conditions that must be satisfied in order for something
to count as law. It is normative with regard to the conditions for
applying the concept; it is not normative in the sense of setting out
the conditions that must be satisfied in order that legal practice be
17
justified.
When critics claim that the problem with liberalism is that it is
committed (among other things) to determinacy and objectivity,
what precisely is the target? Is indeterminacy an objection to liberal
judicialpractice in the sense that if such institutions are indeterminate that would in principle render them less (or in-)defensible? Or
is it instead a problem in "liberalism" as an "analytic" account of
our practices, in the sense that the best available "liberal" account
of our practices coheres only because it treats adjudication as
determinate? In establishing that law is indeterminate, then, have
we lost hope of finding a way to see our practices as liberal? Or is
the determinacy of adjudication part of normative liberalism in the
sense that the only kind of adjudicatory process that could be
defended on liberal grounds is one in which outcomes were
determinate? In that case, establishing law's indeterminacy would
show that our adjudicatory processes did not measure up to liberal
ideals, and could not be defended on those grounds.
Similar remarks are in order regarding objectivity.
Is the
problem that important legal practices, like adjudication, are not
objective in the relevant sense, and so less (or in-)defensible in
principle? Or is it that the best available "liberal" jurisprudence of
that practice is coherent just because it sees adjudication as
objective when in fact it is not? The failure of objectivity, then,

17 One can run these two ideas together, of course, by advancing a normative
jurisprudence according to which the term law could only be correctly applied to a
practice if the practice itself were normatively defensible. Such an account could not
be shown to be false by pointing out that we use the term "law" to refer to many
practices that do not satisfy this condition, because as a normative account it makes
no descriptive claim. It merely recommends or prescribes. Instead, one would have
to argue against the attractiveness of the recommended use, and one obvious thing
to say is that such a proposal makes it difficult, if not impossible, to criticize legal
regimes as unjust. Rather than treating them as unjust, we are left treating them as
not being law at all; and it is hard to see that anything would be gained by such a
strategy.
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would leave us -without a way of understanding our practices as
liberal. Or is the problem that whereas liberalism as a normative
political theory is committed to objectivity, our adjudicatory
practices do not exemplify objectivity of the relevant sort, and so
can not be defended on liberal grounds?
As we shall understand them, the criticisms of liberalism as
indeterminate and not objective have the same basic structure. The
argument proceeds as follows:
(1) Liberal political theory (liberalism as a normative theory) is
committed to determinacy (objectivity).
(2) Legal practice (adjudication) is indeterminate (not objective).
(3) Therefore, existing liberal practices cannot be defended on
(because they are inconsistent with) liberal principles.
In making this argument, the critic often does not argue for
premise (1). Typically, citations to various philosophers, such as
Rawls, are treated as if they suffice to establish its truth.18 Premise
(2) is supported in a variety of ways, sometimes by appeal to
contestable interpretations of our existing practice, often, however,
by appeal to philosophical theories, typically about the nature of
reasons generally, or legal reasons in particular.19 Proposition (3)
is then said to follow from the premises, thus assuring the argument's validity. Given its validity, the truth of the premises assure
its soundness.
We do not deny the validity of the argument with respect to its
claims about either determinacy or objectivity; we do deny its
soundness in both cases, however. Consequently, this Article falls
into two distinct parts. In the first part we evaluate the above
argument with respect to its claims about indeterminacy. In that
Section, our first goal is to clarify the so-called "indeterminacy
thesis." Then we argue that law can be and often is indeterminate
in the way critics take it to be. Though we accept the truth of the
second premise with regard to determinacy, we argue that many of
18See

Singer, supra note 1, at 25 n.74 (citing Rawis's statement that the principles
of justice are objective).
" See id. at 6 (stating that "legal reasoning is indeterminate and contradictory
[and] cannot resolve legal questions in an 'objective' manner"); see alsoJames Boyle,
The Politics of Reason: CriticalLegal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 685, 695 n.29 (1985) (agreeing with Legal Realists that "dogma of objectivity...
in legal reasoning serves to obscure the fact thatjudicial opinions arise from a matrix
of social and political forces"); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL.
L. REv. 1151, 1152 (1985) (noting that "legal analysis cannot be neutral and determi-

nate").
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the claims made on behalf of that premise are based on philosophical confusions, and are often (on other grounds) unpersuasive. In
contrast to liberalism's critics, however, we reject the first premise.
Instead, we argue that liberalism as a normative political theory is
not committed to determinacy, though it has several other commitments with which determinacy might be easily confused.
In the second part of the Article, we reject the argument with
respect to its claims about objectivity. With respect to objectivity,
we accept the first premise, but reject the second. In our view, legal
practice is objective in a suitable sense, and thus the argument
against liberalism fails.
Our thought is that, as a first approximation, those who worry
about law's objectivity are concerned about whether the decisions
judges reach are objectively correct or whether instead they are
correct just because the judge so regards them. Let us characterize
this as a worry about the metaphysical objectivity of "legal facts."
Any time a judge renders a decision, she asserts the existence of
what we are calling a legal fact; for example, "Coleman's failure to
inspect constitutes negligence," or "Leiter's failure to deliver
constitutes a breach of contract." The question about metaphysical
objectivity, then, is the question about the status of these facts, that
is, about whether they hold independently of what a particularjudge
happens to think, or perhaps independently of what all lawyers and
judges would think.
We distinguish among three conceptions of metaphysical
objectivity: minimal, strong, and modest. Minimal and strong
objectivity are, under different names, more or less familiar to
philosophers of law; modest objectivity is not. The remainder of
this Article is devoted to explaining and defending the plausibility

of modest objectivity as the kind of metaphysical objectivity
presupposed by our legal practice of adjudication.
I. DETERMINACY
A. Varieties of Legal Indeterminacy
1. Reasons and Causes
We begin by drawing a distinction between (in)determinacy of
reasons and (in)determinacy of causes.2"
Often we want to know
20

This distinction is drawn and explored in Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and
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whether a particular legal outcome or result isjustyfied. Justification
is provided by reasons. The thesis that law suffers from indeterminacy of reasons is a claim about the relationship between the set of
available legal reasons and the justification of legal outcomes. On
other occasions, we seek an explanation of the outcome a judge (or
panel of judges) has reached in a particular case. On the theory
that explanations are primarily causal, an explanation of an outcome
is provided by identifying its causes. The thesis that law suffers
from indeterminacy of causes is a claim about the inadequacy of the
set of legal reasons as causes of judicial opinions. In short,
indeterminacy theses make claims about the relationship between
legal reasons and the outcomes of cases: the indeterminacy of
reasons thesis claims that the relationship of the former to the latter
isjustificatorilyinadequate; the indeterminacy of causes thesis claims
that the relationship of the former to the latter is explanatorily
inadequate.
Our immediate concern is with indeterminacy of reasons. Given
that, our next task is to distinguish between two forms of indeterminacy. In one sense, a rule is indeterminate if there is more than
one way of fulfilling its demands. In the other, to say that a rule is
indeterminate is to make a claim about the lack of uniqueness with
respect to what the rule is. Indeterminacy of the first type is not
only unavoidable; it is both necessary and desirable. The duty to be
charitable, for example, imposes constraints on behavior even if no
way of understanding it eliminates entirely one's latitude in
discharging the duty it imposes. What is not legitimate is failing to
discharge the duty in some plausible way. An agent who acts
according to such principles is not subject to criticism simply
because she took one rather than another justified course of
conduct. One might even argue that the absence of latitude in
satisfying the demands of moral rules would be a failing in a moral
theory: a failing, because it would be based on an inappropriate
conception of the person, of human cognitive and psychological
capacities, and of the nature of practical reason. Because indeterminacy of this sort is both unavoidable and desirable in any system of
norms, it cannot be the kind of indeterminacy that troubles
liberalism's critics. Therefore, we take it that the kind of indetermi-

Varieties of Legal Indeterminacy (Sept. 27, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors).
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nacy that is thought to create a problem for liberalism is indeterminacy about what the rule is-not about how the rule can be satisfied.
Indeterminacy of reasons is a thesis about the inadequacy of
legal reasons as (full) justifications of the outcomes they are offered
to support. The set of legal reasons is a function of two elements:
(i) the set of valid or binding legal sources; and (ii) the set of
interpretive operations that can be legitimately performed on those
sources (to generate rules and principles of law) and the set of
rational operations that can be performed on law and facts (to
generate outcomes). Valid sources will invariably include at least
statutes and precedents; typical (interpretive and rational) operations will include canons of interpretation (e.g., for constructing the
"rule" of a prior decision) as well as forms of legal reasoning,
including deduction and analogy.
Every theory of law (or jurisprudence) provides an account of
the conditions of membership in the class of legal reasons. The
indeterminacy thesis is the claim that the set of legal reasons,
regardless of its actual content, will be indeterminate with respect
to its justificatory relationship to the outcomes judges reach. At its
core, the indeterminacy thesis is a claim about the ability of
reasons-legal reasons in particular, but perhaps also reasons in
general-to justify fully the outcomes in favor of which they are
adduced. And this is one way in which the indeterminacy argument
might be said to draw, at least in part, on traditional philosophical
theories about meaning and metaphysics-in this case, the meaning
and essence of reasons. Before we explore the extent to which such
efforts are warranted, we need to provide a more precise formulation of the indeterminacy thesis. In what sense is the class of legal
reasons invariably indeterminate? What form of justificatory
inadequacy is marked by indeterminacy?
One formulation of the indeterminacy of reasons thesis is the
claim that:
(1) The set of legal reasons is never adequate to warrant any
result.
Understood in this way, law is indeterminate only if no legal
outcome can be justified in the light of the class of available legal
reasons. If that is so, then the possibility of legitimate legal
authority is thrown into doubt, since, at the very least, authority
presupposes that some of the outcomes that are enforced by law are
warranted by law. This formulation is too strong, however. Even
indeterminists who believe that proposition (1) is true are not likely
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to believe that it must be true in order for indeterminacy to pose a
serious obstacle to the possibility of legitimate governance by law.
The claim can be weakened so that:
(2) The set of legal reasons is sufficient to warrant any result.
Instead of claiming that no outcomes are warranted, this version
of the thesis holds that, theoretically at least, all outcomes are
warranted by the set of legal reasons. If all outcomes can be warranted by the set of available legal reasons, then a judge would be
justified in reaching any decision whatsoever. That too would pose
a problem for legal authority since part of our ordinary understanding of authority is that judges are not generally free to pick any
possible outcome and enforce it through the coercive power of the
state. Again, even indeterminists who believe that proposition (2)
is true are not likely to believe that it must be true in order for
indeterminacy to pose a threat to the possibility of legitimate
governance by law. Instead of claiming either that all outcomes are
justified by legal sources or that none are, the indeterminist could
be understood as claiming that:
(3) The set of legal reasons never uniquely warrants (or justifies)
one and only one result in a particular case.
This indeterminist does not claim that the available legal
resources justify all outcomes or no outcomes, nor does she deny
that the set of legal reasons constrains or limits available outcomes.
Instead, she claims that the set of legal reasons is inadequate to
warrant outcomes uniquely. If proposition (3) poses a problem for
the possibility of legitimate governance by law, it can only be
because legitimacy requires that outcomes be uniquely warranted by
the set of legal reasons. The indeterminist who accepts (3) clearly
believes that legal liberalism adheres to what we might call, "the
unique outcome" requirement. Whether analytic jurisprudence is
committed to any such claim is not clear.2 For a very long time,
the leading analytic jurisprude, Ronald Dworkin, appears to have
defended the claim that adjudication was about finding the right
answer to legal disputes,2 2 although he no longer claims that there
2
are right answers to all cases. 3
21

See e.g., STEVENJ. BURTONJUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (1992).

22 See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 81-130; Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1978).
" One reason for the change is the following. In his earlier work, including
Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin had a "rights-based" political theory, according to
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Whereas the typical indeterminist may well believe that either
proposition (1) or (2) is true, she does not have to defend either in
order to make indeterminacy a potentially interesting thesis;
proposition (3) may be interesting enough. On the other hand,
even (3) may be stronger than necessary. Instead of claiming that
the set of legal reasons never uniquely warrants an outcome, the
indeterminist might claim that even if legal reasons sometimes
warrant unique outcomes, they do not do so in important or
controversial cases-precisely the sorts of cases that make it to the
stage of appellate review.2 4 In this view, indeterminacy of reasons
asserts:
(4) The set of legal reasons never uniquely warrants (or justifies)
one and only one outcome in important or hard cases.
Interestingly, if Dworkin is right about positivism, proposition (4)
represents the classic positivist account of judicial discretion. In
that account, there is a distinction between "easy" cases in which
there are unique, determinate outcomes, and "hard" cases in which
judges must exercise discretion precisely because the set of legal
reasons is inadequate to determine or warrant one unique outcome.
If we accept proposition (4) as a plausible formulation of the
indeterminacy of reasons thesis, we can draw some interesting
connections among the indeterminists, the positivists, and Dworkin.
In the first place, both the indeterminist and Dworkin accept the

which the point of adjudication was primarily to determine which of the litigants had
the preexisting right. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 184-205. If there was a
preexisting right in each case, then there was a right answer in each case: namely,
that which answered the question: which litigant has the right?
In his more recent work, especially Law's Empire, adjudication is a practice within
a differently conceived political morality-one that emphasizes the bonds of liberal
community. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 95-96 (1986). In such an account,
there is no need that adjudication settle on uniquely correct answers to all disputes,
and thus Dworkin relaxes the constraint. That does not mean that he no longer
believes that there are correct answers almost all the time. His continued use of the
Hercules construct as a way of fixing right answers to legal disputes indicates that he
is still committed to much more in the way of determinacy than most positivists. But,
as we suggest below, the importance ofjudges aspiring to act like Hercules changes
in the most recent work; there is a different political theory that motivates Hercules,
and it is not one based on right answers. Consequently, the determinacy claim is no
longer at the heart of Dworkin'sjurisprudence. (The reader should note that we are
offering an interpretation of the development of Dworkin's thinking, there are few,
if any, explicit acknowledgements in Dworkin indicating that this is the way he sees
his work developing.)
4 Indeterminists should not dispute the existence of easy cases, but point out that
the legitimacy of adjudication turns only on the cases that are really adjudicatednamely, the hardcases, in which indeterminacy seems indisputably to be a real threat.
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claim that, if true, proposition (4) poses a serious problem for legal
authority. They differ in that the indeterminist believes that
proposition (4) is in fact true, while Dworkin believes it is almost
always false. In the second place, both the indeterminist and the
positivist believe that proposition (4) is true. They differ in that the
indeterminist believes that the truth of (4) spells trouble for a liberal
conception of legal authority, whereas the positivist does not believe
that the truth of (4) is incompatible with liberal legal authority
(neither, arguably, does the Legal Realist).
We now have a working formulation of the indeterminacy thesis.
Next, we need to distinguish among the various arguments for the
existence of indeterminacy. In doing so, we will put ourselves in a
position to assess the truth of the claim that law is indeterminate.
If the law is indeterminate, then the issue will be whether, and to
what extent, indeterminacy poses a problem for the possibility of
legitimate governance by law. We begin with a summary of the
possible sources of legal indeterminacy, keeping in mind that
different kinds or sources of indeterminacy may pose different
challenges to the possibility of legitimate governance by law.
2. Sources of Indeterminacy
We begin by distinguishing between two levels of indeterminacy:
specific and general.5 Specific indeterminacy of reasons makes a
claim about law. It makes no claim about any other domains of
discourse. In contrast, general indeterminacy of reasons is a thesis
about all domains of reason-giving discourse. We might distinguish,
then, between those arguments for law's indeterminacy that follow
from more general concerns about language or reason-giving
discourse and those that derive from features peculiar to legal
discourse. Let us begin with the former.
A range of arguments for legal indeterminacy draw support
from considerations that bear on language generally. All natural
languages contain vague predicatesandfamily-resemblanceconcepts, and
legal discourse is no exception. It may be impossible to determine
whether, in some cases, a person without much hair is bald, a
scribbling art, compensation just, or process due.
In law, these concerns have been addressed in H.L.A. Hart's
discussion of the distinction between the "core" and "penumbra" of
general terms. 6 Judges follow law when the rules apply to core

'26 See Leiter, supra note 20, at 6-7.
See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L.
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instances of general terms, but must exercise discretion when the
question is whether the rule applies to a case involving the penumbra of a general term. When faced with a case involving the
penumbra of legal meaning, a judge has no option but to help fix
the meaning through the exercise of a discretionary authority. In
his earlier essays, Dworkin took issue with this argument for judicial
discretion."
By allowing that moral principles as well as social
policies are binding legal sources in terms of which other legal
directives are to be understood, Dworkin argued that the extent to
which judges must exercise a discretionary authority would be
significantly reduced.2" Understood in this way, the penumbra
argument for judicial discretion appears to depend in part on the
poverty of legal sources and is thought to be mitigated by a richer
domain of legally binding standards.
This line of argument, however, cannot resolve a worry about
vague predicates; the moral principles that are supposed to enrich
the domain of legal sources will, themselves, contain vague
predicates-namely, moral ones (e.g., "just," "fair," "equal"). Some
writers-notably Dworkin and Michael Moore-think this does not in
principle create a problem for legal determinacy; assessing their
views, however, would require taking on their views about the
determinacy of moral reasoning and the truth of moral realism.
29
Instead, we propose to leave these tasks for another occasion.
We want to concentrate on a different and more far-reaching
concern about language-the nature of meaning in general.
There are a variety of considerations normally associated with
Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument 0 that we can capture
under the rubric of semanticskepticism. The semantic skeptic denies
that there are objective facts of a suitable sort that constitute or

REV. 593, 607-15 (1958). We encounter the "penumbra" of a rule when the rule
contains a vague predicate and the facts of the case at hand fall into the realm of
vagueness.
17 See Ronald Dworkin,JudicialDiscretion, 60J. PHIL. 624 passim (1963) [hereinafter Dworkin,JudicialDiscretion];Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L.

REV. 14, 32-40 (1967) [hereinafter Dworkin, Model of Rules].
2' For an application of this Dworkinian line of reasoning to various indeterminacy
arguments, see Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 295 (1989).
2 For some doubts, see Brian Leiter, Objectivity, Morality and the Dworkinian
Maneuver (Sept. 27, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); see also
infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text (discussing the views of Moore and
Dworkin).
"See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 203 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1953).
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determine a word's or a sentence's meaning. Because there is no
fact that is the meaning of a sentence, the meaning of a sentence,
directive, command, or request invariably will be indeterminate. In
other words, what a sentence means cannot be adduced by pointing
to some fact that is its meaning. Thus, the meaning of a sentence
is indeterminate because there are no objective facts that would
render it determinate. If this is true of language generally, then it
is true of law a fortiori.
Semantic skepticism supports a form of generalindeterminacy of
reasons, which applies to law as well as to any other semantic
domain. We want to begin, however, by examining forms of
indeterminacy that are specific to law. We will be concerned with
two. First, one worry about the determinacy of law is that at some
appropriate level of abstraction, legal sources are inconsistent or
fundamentally contradictoy (or that the legitimate operations
performed on them lead to inconsistent rules or principles). If legal
sources are contradictory in the formal sense, then any outcome can
be derived from them; any proposition, true or false, can be derived
from a contradiction."' If all possible legal outcomes follow from
inconsistent premises, then the law is indeterminate in the senses
expressed by propositions (4), (3), and (2) above.
A second source of the indeterminacy thesis specific to law is
the claim that the set of legal reasons is either too impoverished or
too rich. This has the air of paradox about it and so needs
clarification. There is a natural way of thinking about legal sources
and the operations that can be performed on them that suggests
both sources of indeterminacy. On the one hand, it is natural to
suppose that a legal system that had few sources, few canons of
interpretation, and few restrictive forms of reasoning from those
sources would find itself with insufficient resources to resolve legal
disputes authoritatively. Judges would often find themselves
unavoidably having to resort to nonlegal sources and forms of
argument in order to resolve disputes. This way of thinking
Sentences of the form "ifp then q" are conditionals,written in logic as "p-*q."
Such sentences are materially equivalent to sentences of the form "notp or q"written
in logic as "-p v q." These two sentences have the same truth value which means
that whenever one is true so too is the other. "-p v q" is true whenever either "-p"
is true or "q"is true. "-p" is true whenever "p"is false. Therefore, "-p v q" is true
whenever "p"is false. A contradiction always has the truth value "false." So
whenever "p"is a contradiction, "p"is false: "-p v q" is true. And whenever
"-p v q" is true so too is "p-q". Thus, the claim is that anything follows from a
contradiction: whatever "q"is, "p-q"is true.
s
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suggests that the richer the stock of legal sources and operations on
them, the less likely judges will be to appeal to extralegal norms to
resolve disputes before them. The natural inference is that the
degree of indeterminacy in a legal regime is a function of the
richness of the set of legal reasons. The richer the set, the more
complete it is; the more complete, the fewer the "gaps"; the fewer
the gaps, the less indeterminate.
This argument suggests that indeterminacy is a byproduct of a
poverty of available or authoritative sources and operations on
them. It is natural to understand this argument as grounded in the
idea that an impoverished set of authoritative standards and
interpretive resources will yield numerous "gaps." Law is necessarily indeterminate simply because no matter how rich the set of
authoritative standards and operations are, there will always be cases
that fall under no binding standard; there will always be gaps. To
be sure, the extent of the problem of indeterminacy that results
from gaps will be diminished by ever enriching the set of authoritative standards and sources; still, it cannot be eliminated altogether.
There will always be gaps in the law.
Enriching the class of legal reasons will reduce indeterminacy
owing to gaps, but it creates its own set of problems and sources of
indeterminacy. As a legal system enriches the set of available
binding legal sources, judges will always have more than one norm
or rule that is arguably applicable or controlling. If that is so, then
there may be no one rule or norm that uniquely controls a case.
There may, then, be too many standards available for adjudicating
a case to claim that there is only one uniquely warranted outcome.
Arguments for indeterminacy, then, can be grounded on
considerations of law's internal and unavoidable inconsistency, the
relative poverty or richness of legal reasons, and general semantic
skepticism. In the next few Sections, we explore these sources of
indeterminacy. In doing so, we will try to assess the general merits
of the arguments in favor of indeterminacy. Whereas we believe
that the arguments for indeterminacy, as usually presented, are
often unconvincing and typically overstate its scope, we do not deny
that there are important ways in which the set of legal reasons will
be indeterminate. Nor do we intend to deny that certain forms of
indeterminacy can pose a problem for the possibility of legitimate
governance by law. Nevertheless, the problems posed by indeterminacy are in no way fatal to the possibility of legitimate authority-or
so we argue. In considering the sources of indeterminacy, we begin
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by considering one type of general indeterminacy of reasons, what
we have been calling semantic skepticism.
3. Semantic Skepticism
The core of semantic skepticism is the claim that there are no
facts that constitute or determine a sentence's meaning, so that
language is indeterminate at the most basic level: there are no
objective facts that make it the case that language means one thing
rather than another. Thus, there is no point to claiming that a legal
rule can be satisfied by some actions but not others since the
meaning of the rule is always "up for grabs."
This line of argument is motivated largely by Saul Kripke's
skeptical reading of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. 2
Let us briefly set out Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's
argument."8 In philosophy, it is customary to draw a distinction
between discourses that are cognitivist (or fact-stating) and those that
are noncognitivist. A cognitivist discourse is one in which the
sentences state facts, and in which the meaning of those sentences
is given by the conditions in the world under which the sentences
would be true (i.e., the meaning is given by the truth-conditions)., 4
We typically identify cognitivist discourses by their syntactic form;
thus, for example, sentences which are assetoric or declarative we
generally view as cognitive. So the sentence, "Guido is in the
room," asserts a particular fact-that Guido is in the room-and the
meaning of the sentence is given by the circumstances under which
it would be true (i.e., Guido is, in fact, in the room).
It has been an important lesson of twentieth-century philosophy
that syntactic form can be misleading as to semantics (or meaning).
Noncognitivism is the view that a particular discourse is not primarily
descriptive or fact-stating, and thus that the meaning of its sentences is not given by truth-conditions (i.e., by the obtaining of the facts
asserted in the sentences). Thus, noncognitivists about ethics, from

32

See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 55-113

(1982). Kripke's reading was prefigured by others, notably, ROBERT J. FOGELIN,
WrTTGENSTEIN (1976) and CRISPIN WRIGHT, WITTGENSTEIN ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF
MATHEMATICS (1980).
" We follow in broad outline the illuminating account in Alexander Miller,
Kripke's Wittgenstein 2-13 (Sept. 2, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with

authors).
4

See DONALD DAVIDSON, Truth and Meaning, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND
INTERPRETATION 17, 17-36 (1984); Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth, 4
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 341, 341-76 (1944).
3
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A.J. Ayer to Allan Gibbard,"5 hold that, notwithstanding the
surface syntax of moral discourse ("Guido is a just man"16), such
discourse states no facts, but instead gives expression to certain
attitudes: its meaning, then, comes not from its truth-conditions
(there are none), but rather from its expressive role.
Kripke's Wittgenstein-or Kripkenstein-can be read as arguing
that sentences that ascribe meaning are, despite their syntactic
appearance, also noncognitive: they state no facts, in the sense that
there are no facts by virtue of which the sentence would be made
true. When we say, "This rule means X," there are no facts we can
identify that would constitute the rule's meaning X. While Hume
had argued that sentences about morality or causation are essentially noncognitive-such sentences state no facts in the sense that there
are no facts that constitute something causing something elseKripkenstein advances the startling position that sentences about
meaning itself are noncognitive: there are no facts constituting or
determining an expression meaning one thing rather than another.
In order to establish this thesis, Kripkenstein allows that there
might be two domains in which we might search for the relevant
objective facts:
the speaker's previous verbal and nonverbal
behavior and the speaker's mental states. Kripkenstein then allows
that we have full information about these domains. His argument
is designed to show that there can be no facts that constitute
meaning since even with full access to these domains, we can find
no property or fact that constitutes the meaning of the sentence,
i.e., no fact which establishes that the sentence means one thing
rather than another.
Kripke offers the following (now) famous example to illustrate
the argument. Take the sentence, "57 + 65 = 5," and compare it
with the sentence "57 + 65 = 122." Suppose we wanted to know
what the "+"expression means. The skeptical argument is that there
is no fact about a person's past behavior with respect to "+" that
would fix its meaning such that one, but not the other, of the above
uses is correct. To see this, suppose that I have performed simple
arithmetic sums in the past only involving numbers below 57. Then
5

SeeALFREDJ. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LoGic 20-22, 107-08,110-12 (Dover
Publications 1952) (1936); ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHoIcEs, APT FEELINGS 105-25
(1990).
Compare this with the syntax of "Guido is a large man," which we are inclined
to understand in cognitivist terms: i.e., it states a fact (about Guido's size), and its
meaningis equivalent to the conditions under which the statement is true (i.e., Guido
is, in fact, large in size).
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that past behavior is perfectly compatible with "+" meaning either
"the sum of the integers" (addition) or "the sum of the integers
except when adding numbers above 56 in which case always give the
answer 5" (quaddition).
Note what the argument here is not. The argument is not that
we do not know that 57 + 65 = 5 is wrong while 57 + 65 = 122 is
correct. We do know that the former is incorrect and that the latter
is correct. Rather, the argument is that we can identify no objective
fact thatjustifies our correctness judgments: i.e., no fact about our
usage of the "+" sign, such that it is compatible with only one of the
two sums. If we are still able to make correctness judgments about
meaning-and we are-it is not because there are objective facts that
constitute meaning: such correctness must have some other source.
This source is identified in what Kripke calls the "skeptical solution."
In short, the Kripkensteinian solution 7 is to accept the conclusion of the skeptical argument-there are no facts determinative or
constitutive of meaning-but to suggest that we look for the
criterion of correctness with respect to meaning elsewhere: not in
some fact that makes it the case that X means Y, but rather in the
circumstances and conditions under which our community will let
us assert particular sentences. Meaning, then, is not a matter of
truth-conditions, but rather of assertibility-conditions (i.e., the
conditions under which a community of language users permits
assertion of a particular sentence). The sentence "57 + 65 = 122" is
correct not because there is some fact that constitutes the meaning
of the "+" sign, but rather because in our community, we are only
permitted to use the "+" sign consistent with addition rather than
quaddition.
Critics of liberalism might read Kripkenstein as showing that the
law must be radically indeterminate. For if meanings are indeterminate-in the sense that there are no objective facts about meaning,
only what the community will and will not allow us to assert-then

17

Arguably, this solution is not Wittgenstein's, because his original problem is not

a skeptical one. See John McDowell, Wittgenstein on Followinga Rule, 58 SYNTHESE
325, 331 (1984) ("The right response to the paradox, Wittgenstein in effect tells us,

is not to accept it but to correct the misunderstanding on which it depends: that is,
to realize that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.");Crispin
Wright, KripkesFAccount ofthe Argument Against PrivateLanguage, 81J. PHIL. 759, 77778 (1984) ("Wittgenstein's conclusion, however, is emphatically not that there is no
such thing as the fulfillment of a prior intention-the conclusion, in effect, of Kripke's
skeptic.").
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the law, which depends on meaning (e.g., on rules meaning one
thing rather than another), must also be indeterminate. If language

itself is indeterminate, then legal language is indeterminate a
fortiori.
There are three possible responses to this line of argument. The
first is to deny the soundness of Kripke's construal of Wittgenstein,
for Kripke's reading is, in fact, quite controversial."8 This line of
response, however, is really beside the point since it is not the
accuracy of Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein that is at issue. Kripke
can be all wrong about Wittgenstein, but right about meaning.
Instead of attacking the accuracy of the attribution of the argument
to Wittgenstein, a good response will have to attack the argument
itself, or its alleged consequences. In this vein, a second response
might be this: even if Kripkenstein is right in his skeptical argument, it does not follow that meaning is indeterminate in any
problematic sense. All that follows is that there are no facts about
meaning that are completely independent of how we are disposed
to construe meanings. Meaning is not radically indeterminate;
instead, meaning is public-fixed by public behavior, beliefs, and
understandings. There is no reason to assume that such conventions cannot fix the meaning of terms determinately. Indeed, such
a response would be fully acceptable to Kripkenstein himself: the
skeptical solution shows precisely how there can be "communal"
facts-but not objective facts-about meaning. Moreover, even if
communal conventions are themselves indeterminate in important
ways, it will not be for the kinds of reasons we are considering in
-this Section, namely, that the meaning of sentences cannot be fixed
by strongly objective facts about the speaker's previous verbal and
8 9
nonverbal behavior or her mental states.
This response is closely related to a third response to the
Kripkensteinian argument for legal indeterminacy. As we noted in

" See McDowell, supra note 37, at 330-32 (emphasizing the distinction between
Kripke's endorsement of the "misunderstanding" and Wittgenstein's attempt to
correct it); Wright, supra note 37, at 760 ("[Tlhere is strong prima facie reason to
doubt whether accommodation with ... the skeptical solution ... which Kripke
represents Wittgenstein as commending can really be lived with . . ").
" Other questions have been raised about the coherence and viability of the
skeptical solution. For example, some writers have worried that skepticism about

meaning facts will also warrant skepticism about other facts, like facts about
communal dispositions of use. For some discussion, see Warren Goldfarb, Kripke on
Wittgenstein on Rules, 82 J. PHIL. 471, 485 (1985); Wright, supra note 37, at 761-66.
We do not pursue these difficult issues here.
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the Introduction,40 philosophical arguments are often offered
primarily for the purposes of giving an explanation or ajustification
of our existing practices. Criticisms of philosophical theses are not
normally intended to call into doubt the underlying practice; rather,
they are offered to raise doubts about a certain picture or way of
understanding the practice. This is an important point, but easy to
miss.
Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis, for example, is not
designed to prevent us from buying or reading texts in translation,
but to raise doubts about the picture of meaning that emphasizes
intensionality.4' The very same point can be made about Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's goal-as opposed to Kripkenstein's-is to call
into question a certain Platonic picture of the foundation of
semantics that some might have thought explains or justifies
important features of our linguistic practices. If the argument
completely succeeds, it does not, for example, raise doubts about
our ability to know the determinate meaning of a rule, but only
about the source of that knowledge. If Kripkenstein's skeptical
solution is right, then that source is not some semantic fact in
Platonic heaven, but rather the conventions of use that comprise
our linguistic community. The practice of rule-following--by judges
or anyone else-remains intact, but our philosophical picture of its
possibility changes.
4. Legal Contradiction
Whereas semantic skepticism argues that legal discourse is
fundamentally indeterminate, the claim that law is indeterminate
because it is fundamentally and internally inconsistent or contradictory depends on legal rules having determinate meanings, or
meanings sufficiently determinate to allow that they might contradict one another. At some level, it is obviously an empirical
question whether the available set of legal sources is inconsistent.
Suppose, however, that the set of binding legal standards has a
formal contradiction embedded within it. Since every outcome is
implied by a formal contradiction, all outcomes are entailed by the

4o See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
41 See WILLARD V.0. QUINE, WORD AND OBJEcT 26-79 (1960). We are grateful to
Yale law student Chris Kutz for suggesting this illustration of our general point.
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set of legal reasons, and therefore all outcomes are warranted. No
42
outcome is warranted uniquely, and the law is indeterminate.
It would be impossible to deny that law is indeterminate under
these conditions. It is also true, however, that legal standards are
rarely formally contradictory. If they were, the problem with legal
authority would not be that outcomes would be indeterminate;
rather, it would be that the law would be formally contradictory.
Indeterminacy is just one of the many undesirable consequences of
law's inconsistency-and hardly the most troubling either. If the
indeterminacy thesis is really the claim that law is formally contradictory, then apart from noting that law is rarely formally contradicthat
tory in the way the argument envisions, there is no denying
43
indeterminate.
be
would
law
the
conditions
under those
The indeterminacy theorist may object that we are underestimating the extent to which legal regimes are contradictory. One idea,
associated with CLS, is that liberalism suffers from a "fundamental
The fundamental contradiction refers to the
contradiction." 44
purportedly inescapable tension between our need for others and
our fear of them, which has as one of its more significant political
analogues our need for centralized powers to protect our autonomy
45
and our fear that these same powers will usurp that autonomy.
As many writers have already observed, this is not, of course, a
Indeed, it is a complex matter how one
contradiction.46

42

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
"' In the next Section, we discuss a different-and genuine-source of legal
indeterminacy under the rubric"conflicting norms." See infrapart I.A.5. This rubric
is often described as involving "contradictions." We eschew that loose usage in order
to distinguish that case from the cases discussed in the present Section.
4See, e.g., ROBERTO UNGER, PASSION 20 (1984) ("We present to one another both
an unlimited need and an unlimited danger, and the very resources by which we
attempt to satisfy the former aggravate the latter."); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure
of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 209, 213 (1979) ("The fundamental
contradiction-that relations with others are both necessary to and incompatible with
our freedom-is not only intense. It is also pervasive.").
4 The analogy is this: we need others to constitute our individual identity
(through friendship, love, etc.), yet at the same time there is the risk that they will
destroy our individual autonomy (through rejecting us, betraying us, objectifying us,
etc.).
' See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 247, 257 (1984) ("[W]hat Kennedy calls a 'contradiction' is not a logical
contradiction at all but merely a reflection of the complexity of human relationships.").
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mediates between the need for coercive political powers to protect
autonomy and the threat those same powers pose to autonomy; and
it has been a central theme of liberal political theory to explore the
boundaries of legitimate coercion. But complexity is not contradiction, and simply calling it otherwise does not make it so. To be
sure, there have been some powerful philosophical challenges to
this liberal program-for example, from Robert Paul Wolff4 7 -which
have met equally powerful replies.4" But absent some demonstration of the impossibility of liberal political theory-that is, the
impossibility of providing a theory of the terms of legitimate
mediation between coercion and autonomy-there is little more that
can be said at this juncture.4 9

47 See ROBERT P. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALIsM 3-50 (1968) (arguing that
insofar as our enterprises are inherently social, the central problem of government
cannot be, as liberalism presupposes, the regulation of each person's infringement on
the sphere of other persons' actions, but rather the coordination of actions and the
choice of collective goals).
48 See,. e.g., RAZ, supranote 5, at 18 ("While not denying that governments can and
often do pose a threat to individual liberty, there is another conception which regards
them also as a possible source of liberty. [Governments] can create conditions which
enable their subjects to enjoy greater liberty than they otherwise would.").
4' Talk of the "fundamental contradiction" in the CLS literature has echoes of
anti-Kantian and antiliberal arguments in Hegel. Hegel's arguments, however, can be
reconstructed in ways that demonstrate his opponents' involvement in genuine logical
contradictions once one grants Hegel certain strong metaphysical theses. Thus, in the
famous master-and-slave section of The Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel shows that
the putatively Kantian ideal of an independent self-consciousness is contradictory
because: (i) to be independent is not to be dependent on anything or anyone; but (ii) to
be self conscious is to depend upon the recognition of other persons. See G.W.F.
HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SPIRr 111-19 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977).
Granted (ii), it follows that an independent self-consciousness is a contradiction in
terms. Similar Hegelian arguments can be constructed against the liberal ideal of
freedom as involving a separate and protected sphere of autonomy, into which the
community cannot intrude. See id. at 211-17. But since freedom, for Hegel, involves
rational action, and rationalaction is only possible for the person whose actions are
harmonious with the purposes of a rationalcommunity, it is a contradiction to think
of freedom in terms of separation from, rather than immersion in, the (perhaps
coercive) purposes of the community.
These are hasty summaries of difficult arguments, but they should remind us that
there is a genuine set of antiliberal arguments based on contradictions in liberal
theory. While the Crits, through their superficial engagement with Hegel and Lukacs,
have picked up similar-sounding themes, they have actually abandoned all the
philosophical content of genuine antiliberal positions.
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5. Gaps and Conflicting Norms

Indeterminacy that is thought to arise because of either the
relative poverty or richness of legal sources and interpretive
operations represents two very different, indeed, contrary ideas.
One is that law is indeterminate whenever the set of legal reasons
is impoverished; the other is that law is indeterminate whenever the
set of legal reasons is too rich. The poverty claim draws on the
notion of "gaps" in the law. The idea is simple enough. In a
primitive or immature legal system, legally binding sources for
resolving disputes will be in relatively short supply. Therefore,
there are bound to be cases in which no controlling legal source
exists. While enriching the set of sources will reduce the extent of
indeterminacy, it can never eradicate indeterminacy altogether; it
will always be possible to imagine a case in which no binding legal
standard applies. Thus, because there will always be gaps in the law,
there will always be some degree of indeterminacy.
Without denying the possibility that a legal system bereft of
binding legal sources will be indeterminate in important ways, it is
worth noting that the argument for indeterminacy from the
existence of gaps can be more misleading than illuminating, for
three separate reasons. In the first place, if there are gaps in the
law, their existence is not likely to depend on features of the legal
practice that are peculiarly liberal; gaps do not appear to discriminate between liberal and other legal regimes. Second, the existence
of gaps is insufficient to establish the indeterminacy thesis, namely,
proposition (4) above."0 All that the possibility of gaps in the law
establishes is the possibility of novel cases not governed by existing
standards and interpretive resources; it does not establish that
important or controversial cases (e.g., abortion, death penalty) lack
determinate answers. Nor does the existence of gaps in the law
establish, without the benefit of further argument, that indeterminacy is widespread or problematic.
Most importantly, the claim that there are genuine gaps in
mature legal systems (which liberal regimes presumably are) is
misleading at best. Given the set of standards and accepted tools
for thinking about the relationship between binding standards and
various fact patterns available in a reasonably mature legal system,
it is unlikely that genuine gaps exist. For almost any dispute that we
could imagine arising, there exists some legal norm or rule that
' See supra part IA.1.
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bears on its resolution. It may well be that the relationship between
the rules from which judges could legitimately draw and the issue
before them is so weak that no decision could be said to be
warranted by the rules, but that is very different from saying that no
rule applies, that, in other words, there is a genuine gap in the law.
There is an important distinction between the claim that no
binding source-principle or rule-is available as a legitimate
resource to enable ajudge to think fruitfully about a dispute before
her (a genuine gap), and the claim that in most legal systems, there
will always be norms that bear on every dispute, but that, in some
cases, the relationship between the norms and any outcome ajudge
might reach is too weak to warrant or justify the decision. In such
cases, we might say that no outcome is warranted by the set of legal
standards, and that the outcomes judges reach in those cases are
indeterminate in the requisite sense. Thus, even in mature legal
systems law can be indeterminate without its indeterminacy arising
from the existence of gaps in the law. Talk of gaps is, at best,
simply a misleading way of referring to indeterminacy that arises
when the justificatory relationship between existing legal reasons
and outcomes is too weak to support the claim that any of the
available outcomes a judge could reach is justified or adequately
warranted by the class of legal reasons. While we are not comfortable with the term "gaps-in-the-law," we do not deny that the kind
of indeterminacy intended to be signalled by that phrase exists in all
legal systems. Still, as we note above, that form of indeterminacy
does not discriminate between liberal and nonliberal legal regimes,
nor does its existence establish the truth of the indeterminacy
thesis.
If we focus instead on legal regimes rich in authoritative legal
resources, we can identify at least two possible sources of indeterminacy. The first we have considered above:51 indeterminacy that
arises because those reasons do not sufficiently support any
outcome in particular, even though the set of legal sources provides
resources with which ajudge might reason fruitfully about cases. In
contrast, we can focus on the case in which differing legal resources
warrant conflicting outcomes. The idea is that in any legal regime
richly endowed with argumentative resources, binding legal sources,
while not strictly contradictory, will nevertheless support conflicting
outcomes or decisions. Thus, instead of no legal reason sufficing to
"' See supra text following note 31.
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warrant an outcome, the problem more often will be that different
legal reasons to which we are otherwise committed warrant
52
conflicting outcomes or decisions.
One obvious response to this line of argument maintains that
even conflicting norms can be ordered in their appropriateness or
importance, or their relative weights accounted for in some way that
resolves the apparent conflict. Against this response, note that it is
possible that no common scale along which the conflicting values
are to be compared, measured, evaluated, and in virtue of which be
ordered, exists. Norms and the underlying values they express may
be incommensurable in important ways.5'
We need to distinguish between two conclusions a critic might
draw from the incommensurability of values and the legal standards
expressing them. The first is that legal outcomes will be indeterminate. The second is that legal argument cannot be rational. If the
argument is sound, it implies that legal outcomes will be indeterminate-in the sense that no outcome is uniquely warranted. On the
other hand, it does not follow that legal discourse cannot be largely
rational. Rational disagreement about law (or morals) is perfectly
compatible with the lack of unique determination, and so it does
not follow from the fact that outcomes are indeterminate over some
52 Sometimes critics of liberalism who talk about the "contradictions" in law can

be understood in a way that makes such "contradictions" equivalent to the source of
indeterminacy we are now considering. In this sense, two or more valid legal sources
each fully warrant conflicting outcomes. Thus, we might loosely say that the sources
contradict each other. In some views, this type of contradiction is thought to arise
because of the existence of the more fundamental, or global contradiction of
liberalism, discussed supra, part I.A.4.
It is important to note, however, that this putative form of contradiction in virtue
of conflicting norms or outcomes is no contradiction at all. It is just another way of
saying that different norms that apply to us, that are part of the system ofprinciples
and policies that govern our actions, draw us in different directions. There is nothing
contradictory in this fact alone, and it is hardly so much a misfortune of liberal
political or legal theory as it is a consequence or feature of an enlightened sense of
the complexity of human motivation.
" See RAZ, supra note 5, at 321-66 (defining the concept of incommensurability
and explaining why values are incommensurable); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 56 (1993) ("The more a given scale of value
encompasses very different, categorically unranked ways ofmeetingit, the more scope
there is for incommensurability."); Charles Taylor, The Diversity of Goods, in 2
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 230,230-47 (Charles
Taylor ed., 1985) (arguing against those ethical and political theories which, informed
by utilitarianism, ignore the fact that certain goals such as integrity, charity and
liberation merit a special kind of pursuit and are incommensurable with our other

goals).
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domain or range of cases that all choices are equally defensible or
that no exercise of rational judgment can be defended.
In our account, indeterminacy is a failure of warrant, of the
justificatory relationship between reasons provided by legal sources
and the outcomes they are presumed to support. Therefore, to the
extent that rational judgment can be defended in the face of
disagreement caused by the fact that different norms support
conflicting conclusions, it will not follow that indeterminacy
understood as a failure of justification or warrant exists, or, to the
extent that it exists, that its existence is problematic. Indeterminacy
is a problem when it suggests that the exercise of rational judgment
cannot be defended as against a different exercise of judgment. If
the existence of conflicting norms entailed the impossibility of
defending the choice of one over another, that would be a problem.
Having said that, we have no reason to deny that sometimes the
conflicts among norms will be sufficiently great and the arguments
on all sides strong enough to justify the claim that no outcome can
be uniquely defended to the exclusion of others. In that case, we
do not intend to deny that in mature legal systems conflicting
norms can present genuine cases of indeterminacy. Nor do we
intend to deny that sometimes even when only coherent and nonconflicting norms apply to a case, the justificatory relationship
between the norms and any outcome a judge might reach is too
weak to claim that the norms warrant the outcome. Thus, we accept
that indeterminacy is a feature of both mature and less well-stocked
legal systems.
6. Summary
In sum: first, if employed to establish radical indeterminacy,
arguments from general semantic considerations are unpersuasive.
Second, the familiar argument for indeterminacy based on the
fundamental liberal contradiction has the misfortune of being based
on a false premise, namely, that liberalism is deeply and fundamentally contradictory. Third, there are nevertheless good reasons for
thinking that law will be indeterminate in a range of important
cases. Legal norms may not sufficiently warrant any outcome in a
case. Different but binding norms within the legal system may each
warrant conflicting outcomes.
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B. Indeterminacy and Authority
1. Why Indeterminacy Matters
It would be foolish to deny the possibility of indeterminacy,
though reasonable disagreement about the extent of it in particular
legal systems is obviously possible. Given the likelihood, if not the
inevitability, of indeterminacy, it is reasonable to wonder why
someone might think that its existence poses a problem for the
possibility of legitimate governance by law, or for the possibility of
liberal authority. Why does indeterminacy matter?
There are a variety of plausible answers one could give to this
question, only some of which we can take up here. One idea is that
indeterminacy causes us to rethink the lawyer's conception of legal
practice. In this view, the existence of determinate or right answers
to legal disputes is part of the working framework of legal practice
into which lawyers are socialized. This conception is part of a larger
network of beliefs or presuppositions that form the conceptual
framework of liberal, legal culture. The existence of nontrivial
indeterminacy in the law requires a reconceptualization of liberal
54
legal culture.
A second reason for thinking indeterminacy important is
demonstrated by the following example. Suppose we discover a
pattern of unjust decisions in some domain of law. We may feel it
appropriate to criticize the law or judges for these decisions. To
meet our objection, judges might respond that they too view the
outcomes as unjust, but are incapable of doing otherwise; their
hands are tied in that the decisions they have reached are determined uniquely by the law which binds them. The existence of legal
indeterminacy might be thought to be important insofar as appeal
to it would help undermine arguments of this sort. For if the law
is indeterminate, it is not possible for a judge to say that he was
compelled by law to reach and enforce an unjust decision.5 5

I See Mark Tushnet, The Indeterminacy Thesis (1993) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors). Tushnet argues that the lawyer's conception of adjudication
presupposes determinacy. Thus, finding out that law is in fact indeterminate forces
the lawyer to rethink the descriptive account of it. The problem with this argument
is that it probably misdescribes the practicing lawyer's working conception of legal
practice. Only ordinary citizens, some jurisprudes, and first-year law students have

a working conception of law as determinate.
" This line of argument was brought to our attention by Professor Jack Balkin.
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This argument, however, has only a superficial plausibility, and
legal irideterminacy has nothing to do with it. If a judge reaches a
series of obviously unjust decisions by applying the law, then there
is something morally reprehensible about the law; and what is
reprehensible about it has nothing to do with its being either
determinate or indeterminate. Moreover, liberal theory does not
allow a judge to escape moral disapprobation or sanction by
claiming that the law was determinate. If the law is determinate and
does require morally unjust outcomes-that could not otherwise be
defended (even slightly) 5 --then liberal theory does not excuse the
judge from doing what he ought morally to do, all things considered, and that is to reach some other, more just, solution.
There are at least three other motivations for attributing to
liberalism (as a normative political theory) a commitment to
determinacy as a political ideal. Two of these have to do with "ruleof-law" considerations. First, legal outcomes must be determinate
if individuals are to be put on notice as to their duties under the law
and be provided with an opportunity to conform their behavior
accordingly. Second, legal outcomes are enforceable by force, and
if those outcomes are not warranted by the set of legal reasons, then
the exercise of coercion seems unjustified. The third concern of
liberalism that bears on law's determinacy has to do with the very
possibility of democratic rule. Democracy presupposes that a duly
elected legislature can form ajudgment, enact it through legislation,
and have its will followed by the courts. This presupposition of
democratic rule is incompatible with indeterminacy, or, at least with
more radical forms of it. In the remainder of this part of the
Article, we take up each of these arguments.
2. Indeterminacy and Predictability
Sometimes we want to know not whether a particular outcome
in a case is justified, that is, whether there are reasons sufficient to
warrant it, but whether an outcome can be explained or predicted.
Reasons can figure in explanations and predictions provided they
are causes.5 7 The set of legal reasons is causally indeterminate just
in case it is inadequate to explain or predict the outcomes judges

' By appeal, for example, to the settled expectations of the litigants.
7 See DONALD DAVIDSON, Actions, Reasons and Causes, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND
EVENTS 3, 3-19 (1980) (defending the position that "rationalization is a species of
causal explanation").
5
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reach. If we put the two indeterminacy theses together, we get the
claim that the set of legal reasons is insufficient uniquely to justify
an outcome, or to predict or explain it.
Leiter has observed that the primary legacy of Legal Realism has
been the indeterminacy of reasons hypothesis, whereas the realists
8
themselves were at least as concerned with causal indeterminacy.
The Legal Realists were as interested in understanding why judges
reach the decisions they do as they were in determining whether
those decisions could be justified.5 9 This emphasis on explanation
and prediction is of a piece with well-known realist slogans including: "the law is what judges say it is," or that "the law is the best
prediction of what judges will do in a particular case," and so on.
Not surprisingly, according to the realist, the ideal lawyer is the
one who is in the best position to counsel his clients about what to
expect from litigation. That lawyer will need to know what leads
judges to decide as they do, not what legal reasons, if any, would
justify their decisions. Of course, mostjudges are educated in a way
that would suggest that binding legal reasons will play a prominent
role in their decision-making, but the indeterminacy (of causes)
thesis holds that even where binding legal reasons have a causal
role, they are insufficient to predict or explain judicial decisions.
The best explanation of judicial decisions may include the set of
binding legal reasons, but cannot be limited to them. Instead,
explanations will point to psychological and sociological facts about
judges as part, if not all, of the causal story.6"
Legal Realists claim that the class of legal reasons is causally
indeterminate. On the other hand, like the positivists, the realists
do not seem to doubt the possibility of legitimate governance by
law. 6 ' Why? We cannot be sure, since the realists are relatively

" See Leiter, supra note 20.
59 See, e.g.,JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALTY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 20-21, 146-64, 262-89, 316-25 (Princeton Univ. Press 1973) (1949).
o For the complete picture of realism in this regard, see Leiter, supra note 20, at
145-67, and Brian Leiter, LegalRealism, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis Patterson ed., forthcoming 1995).
61
This is clearest in KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADION (1960)
(implicitly acknowledging that legitimate government by law is possible). We take
Llewellyn as representative of the core of realism, though, admittedly, some who
claimed the label took more extreme views. Of course, Llewellyn himself, by 1960,
had perhaps retreated too far from some important realist themes. For a seminal
discussion, see Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge:
Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 256 (1961)
(criticizing Llewellyn's work, The Common Law Tradition,for "recogniz[ing] judicial
creativity as part of the common law tradition, but ... reject[ing] the notion of
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silent on questions like these. Still, one plausible reason for
thinking that the realists do not view indeterminacy as incompatible
with authority may have something to do with the relationship
between determinacy and predictability.
How does the realists' emphasis on predictability relate to the
claim that legal authority requires determinacy? To answer this
question, we have to answer another question first, namely, what is
the concern or problem for which determinacy is supposed to
provide the only acceptable solution? Here's one possibility. Law
is coercive. At a minimum, in order for the exercise of coercive
power to be justified it must be imposed on individuals who are
capable of conforming their behavior to its demands and who have
the opportunity to do so. Thus, agents must be put on notice of
what is expected of them. Indeterminate law is presumably a
problem for the rule of law because if the law is indeterminate, then
agents are left unaware of what the law requires of them and are
unable to conform their behavior accordingly.
Here is where the realists' emphasis on prediction and causation
comes in. If the need for agents to have the opportunity to
conform their behavior to the law's demands is the concern that
motivates the worry about indeterminacy, then all that is really
required is predictability. If individuals can predict what the law
will require of them, then, in principle, they are on notice and have
the opportunity to conform their behavior to the law's demands.
Notice requires predictability, not determinacy. And the very point
of the realist tradition is that rationally indeterminate outcomes can
nevertheless be reliably predictable-even if the prediction cannot
be made entirely on the basis of the class of legal reasons.
The second reason for thinking that liberals require determinacy
relates to the role of autonomy in the liberal tradition. Liberal
autonomy requires stable, predictable frameworks within which
62
agents are free to pursue their projects, plans, and aspirations.
Only against this background in which much can be taken for
granted, and is not otherwise "up in the air," can individuals
formulate meaningful long term projects and goals and be confident
in their investments in resources necessary to execute them. This
is the kind of liberal political theory that Coleman has begun to
judicial freedom").
62

See, e.g., LOREN LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY

(1987)

(developing a system of rights based on a view of human beings as individuals
concerned with personal projects).
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outline in Risks and Wrongs." In this kind of liberal framework,
determinate outcomes might be thought to matter because of their
relationship to an agent's ability to form reliable expectations and
to the rationality of his investments in resources-including human
capital-necessary to their execution. Once again, if the concern is
that determinacy is necessary for autonomy, then it is unfounded.
Concerns about conformity and autonomy can be met by stability
and predictability, not determinacy. An agent's ability to conform
his behavior to the law's commands ex ante depends on his capacity
to predict what judges will do in applying the law to various fact
patterns, and the sort of stability required for liberal autonomy also
invites the underlying concern for predictable authoritative actions.
In short, indeterminacy will not pose the threat to liberalism one
would otherwise expect, provided that indeterminate judicial
decisions are nevertheless reliably predictable. Establishing that
indeterminacy is compatible with predictability is part of the
unintended Legal Realist legacy, and is in fact a presupposition of
the jurisprudence of liberalism's harshest critics.'
The realists
emphasize that indeterminate outcomes can be predictable, but
what reason do we have for supposing that they are right? After all,
the realists themselves claim that the class of legal reasons is itself
causally indeterminate. That means that predictions cannot be
based entirely on legal reasons.6 5 On what else might such predictions be based?
One suggestion is that reliable predictions about how judges
decide cases requires the existence of a suitable social scientific
theory ofjudging. Several realists believed in the existence of such
theories. Jerome Frank, for one, thought that Freudian psychoanalytic theory provided the right kind of social scientific theory for
accomplishing just that.66 Underhill Moore sometimes favored a
form of Watsonian behaviorism.

63SeeJuLEs COLEMAN,

RISKS AND WRONGS 436 (1992).
" See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstructionof ContractDoctrine,94 YALE

L.J. 997, 1009-10 (1985) (asserting that the idea of indeterminate judicial decisionmaking is not inconsistent with the predictability ofjudicial decisions); David Kairys,
LegalReasoning, in THE POLITIcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRrIQUE 11, 14-15 (David
Kairys ed., 1982) (asserting that althoughjudicial decisions are based on indeterminatejudicial values and priorities, such decisions are not necessarily unpredictable).
' See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 64, at 1009-10 (asserting that because judicial
decisions are indeterminate yet predictable, predictability must be based on
something other than legal doctrine).
66 See generallyJEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
See Leiter, supra note 20, at 81-90 (discussing Underhill Moore's theory of
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The particulars of various theories do not matter for our current
purposes. All we need do is assume that some such theory is a
reliable predictor of what judges will do in particular cases. If such
a theory is available, all agents can in principle predict with a
reasonable degree of confidence what the law will expect of them.
If that is the case, then even though the set of legal sources may be
indeterminate both as reasons and causes, the law itself is predictable and "determinate" in the sense requisite for legitimate
authority. The problem, then, is not indeterminacy per se. Rather,
it is identifying and developing the right kind of reliable social
scientific theory of judicial behavior. Ironically, in a rough and
ready way that identification and development is precisely what the
vast majority of liberalism's critics are really pursuing.
3. Folk Theories and Predictability
Legal Realists like Frank and Moore believed in certain social
scientific theories of judging, but there may be no reason to think
that armchair psychoanalysis and Watsonian behaviorism are correct
accounts of judicial behavior. The problem does not lie solely in
the possibility that Frank and Moore might be wrong; rather, it is
that there may be no social scientific theory of the appropriate sort.
And if no theory of the appropriate sort exists, then prediction is
not possible; and if prediction is not possible, then we are back
where we started-with liberal concerns and worries that are not met
by existing practice. That is only half the problem. Suppose such
a theory did in fact exist. The relevant theory would be either
insufficiently well-known to allow ordinary citizens to avail themselves of it (in which case, judicial outcomes will not be predictable
for them), or it may be sufficiently well-known such that judges
themselves will be aware of it (in which case, judges will respond to
it in ways that will undermine its predictive power).6 8 We now
have two objections to respond to. The first is that prediction
requires a full theory which may not be available. The second is
that if such a theory is available, it will either be inaccessible, or, if
accessible, self-defeating. Let us take these up in turn.
The existence of a full and satisfactory theory is less important
than it first appears: lawyers can and do predict, with a fairly high

adjudication).
" We are indebted to Professor Andrei Marmor of the faculty of law at the
University of Tel Aviv for this objection.
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degree of accuracy, what outcomes judges will reach, and they do so
without anything like Jerome Frank's armchair psychoanalysis or
Underhill Moore's behaviorism. How do lawyers do it, then?
Presumably they do it with some degree of informal psychological,
political, and cultural knowledge constituting a "folk" social
scientific theory of adjudication. The success of this folk theory,
which is, after all, largely coextensive with the talents of lawyers
(i.e., their ability to advise clients what to do, when to go to trial,
when to settle, etc.), may constitute success enough for the purposes
of predictability and authority, regardless of the prospects of social
scientific theories. Even liberalism's harshest critics do not appear
69
to deny the possibility of "folk" theories of judicial behavior.
Thus, Grits and Feminists correlate judicial decisions with wealth,
gender, race, cultural mores, and ideologies. Indeed, doing so is
essential to part of their program, which is to establish the ideological bases of adjudication.
If a correct social scientific theory of judging did exist, most
ordinary citizens would not be aware of it. Then again, they need
not have such a theory in mind in order to steer clear of the law's
wrath. Most people, most of the time, can arrange their affairs to
avoid coming into conflict with the law; like lawyers, ordinary
people can avail themselves of informal psychological, political, and
cultural knowledge in anticipating what courts will do. In those few
cases in which they have genuine doubt about what the law requires
of them, they can (and often do) consult counsel who can deploy
the relevant folk theory. Thus, a theory that is not well-known
across the population as a whole is compatible with legal authority
as long as there is the relevant folk theory to fill in the gaps in their
knowledge.
Suppose the predictive theory is well-known, however. We can
assume that judges are familiar with it. Another possible objection
suggests that judges will not passively participate in a fraud while
the rest of the world knows the true grounds of their decisions.
Surely, judges will respond by making decisions on other grounds,
thus undermining the predictive power of the relevant theory.
The plausibility of this objection depends on the type of
predictive theory at issue. Suppose someone has the following
predictive "theory": "Coleman and Leiter eat when hungry."
69

See, e.g., Kairys, supra note 64, at 15 (asserting that the "shared backgrounds,
socialization, and experience of ourjudges... yield definite patterns in the ways they
categorize, approach, and resolve social and political conflicts").
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Suppose this hypothesis is widely known and becomes known to
Coleman and Leiter. It hardly follows that either Coleman or Leiter
will stop eating when each is hungry or start eating when either is
not hungry. In fact, it may appeal to both Coleman and Leiter to
learn why they eat when they do. Such a theory may give them an
understanding of their behavior that they would not otherwise have,
and so on.
This type of predictive or explanatory theory vindicates the
behavior or decisions in question. But some of the predictive
theories associated with Legal Realism do not seem to have this
character. For example, ifJerome Frank is right, then judges make
decisions because of various neurotic unconscious desires70 ;
bringing these causes of decision to light surely would change
judicial behaviorl Of course, Frank's armchair psychoanalysis never
delivered a powerful predictive theory; and it is surely not the folk
theory of which most lawyers avail themselves. More promising is
the sort of theory envisioned by realists like Karl Llewellyn and
Underhill Moore, according to which judges decide commercial law
cases based on their sense of what would be fair or appropriate in
the particular commercial context, rather than on the basis of legal
rules or prior court decisions.
This type of predicative theory,
should judges become more aware of it, would presumably vindicate
their decisions rather than cause them to act otherwise.
In short, prediction does not require a full theory of judicial
behavior. It requires only an informal "folk" theory of judicial
behavior, of precisely the sort that most lawyers and many citizens
already seem to have. Moreover, no perverse consequences would
follow from judicial knowledge of this theory.
We close this Section by considering one final concern about
causation and adjudication. The argument we have offered accepts
that legal reasons may be causally inadequate to explain or predict
ToSee FRANK, supra note 59, at 146-64.
' See Underhill Moore & Theodore S. Hope, Jr., An InstitutionalApproach to the
Law of CommercialBanking, 38 YALE L.J. 703, 719 (1929); Underhill Moore & Gilbert
Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct DiscountsInstitutionalMethod, 40 YALE L.J. 555, 560 (1931); see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 61.
In Llewellyn's later works, and in Moore's work, this theory took on considerably
more theoretical baggage, but its core is eminently simple and plausible, and a central
component of any commercial lawyer's folk theory. It was common wisdom among
the commercial litigators with whom Leiter practiced in New York City that judges
want to "do what's fair"; the lawyer's job was, first, to present the facts in such a way
that fairness seemed to demand a decision for her client and, second, to provide the
judge with some law on which the judge could "hang his hat."
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judicial behavior. However, it is based on the idea that such
behavior is causally explicable.
Thus, whereas our argument
appears to accept the Legal Realist view of legal reasons as causally
indeterminate, it is not skeptical about the causal efficacy of reasons
generally. Is this a problem? Is it inconsistent? It is neither. In
accepting the indeterminacy of causes thesis, we accept that legal
reasons might not themselves fully cause judicial decisions. We are
not rejecting the possibility that reasons can be causes. To accept
the notion that judicial behavior is not fully caused by the legal
reasons to which judges might be expected to appeal hardly entails
that judicial behavior is itself mysterious or otherwise not subject to
ordinary causal explanation.
4. Determinacy and Warrant by Reason
To this point, we have focused on concerns about determinacy
that can be met by rationally indeterminate but predictable
outcomes. These worries arise by virtue of liberalism's commitment
to the rule of law and from a certain kind of liberal political theory
that emphasizes the centrality of personal autonomy. At first blush,
these considerations suggest that the indeterminacy of the law is
inconsistent with liberal normative theory because rule-of-law and
autonomy considerations essential to the theory require determinacy. If our analysis is correct, however, closer examination reveals
that these concerns require only that the law be reliably predictable,
not that it be determinate. 2 So indeterminate, but predictable,
law satisfies these rule-of-law and autonomy considerations, and
does not, on these grounds at least, fall short of the liberal
normative ideal.
There is no doubt that predictability and stability are important
elements of liberal normative theory. There are, however, other
aspects of liberal normative theory that have considerably less to do
with predictability and stability; aspects of liberalism that one might
think entail a commitment to determinacy. Conceptually at least,
determinacy and predictability are mutually exclusive. Recall that
an outcome is determinate, 7 3 provided it is uniquely warranted by
the set of legal reasons.7 4 Outcomes may be uniquely warranted
without being predictable. The right decision in a case may not
7 See supra part I.B.3.
s Determinate in the sense associated with indeterminacy of reasons.
74
See supra part IA.1.
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have been predictable ex ante, even if it comes to be viewed as the
natural solution ex post. The determinacy thesis makes a claim
about justification: the set of legal reasons uniquely justifies the
outcome. The focus on predictability has nothing to do with
justification, whereas determinacy has everything to do with
justification.
In the previous Sections we have explored the ways in which
certain constraints of liberal political theory draw our attention to
the predictability and stability of judicial decisions. 75 Which
commitments, if any, draw our attention to the justificatory
relationship between legal reasons and judicial decisions?
Once again, the obvious candidate is the fact that legal outcomes
are coercively enforceable. 7' Because the decisions judges reach
are coercively enforceable, it is not enough that those decisions be
predictable. For coercion to be justified, individuals must be able
to conform their conduct to the law's demands and have the
opportunity to do so. This condition is not sufficient, however.
Predictable, but nevertheless unwarranted (or unjustified) outcomes
may not be justifiably enforceable by coercion. In order for the
coercive power of the state to be legitimately employed, judges'
decisions must be justified by something more.
In order to be justified, judicial decisions must be warranted by
the available set of legal reasons. Depending on one's theory of
justification (and of law), being warranted by legal reasons may also
be insufficient to justify coercive enforcement, since even legally
required outcomes may sometimes prove morally indefensible. At
the very least, though, compelling compliance with judicial decisions
can be justified only if those outcomes are warranted by the class of
legal reasons. Thus, predictability may allay some of the concerns
liberals have about coercion, but it cannot allay all of them. The
missing component is determinacy.
This argument correctly points out that concerns about
justification are not reducible entirely to considerations of predictability. In order to be justified, coercion must, at least, enforce
outcomes warranted by the set of legal reasons. That seems right.
But it does not follow that such outcomes must be determinate, that
is, warranted uniquely by the class of legal reasons. Political
coercion is unjustified when it is employed to enforce an unjustyfi-

See supra parts I.B.1-3.

76 See supra part I.B.1.
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able decision, not when it is used to enforce a justifiable (if not
uniquely so) decision. The problem with coercion is its use to
enforce outcomes that are not justified; it is not that coercion is
being employed to enforce justified outcomes that happen not to be
uniquely warranted. Coercion requires warrant, not uniqueness.
Uniqueness, we shall argue, is not a requirement of legitimate

authority.
Is it enough to say that the coercion argument requires only
warrant by dint of legal reasons and not uniqueness (determinacy)?
Consider the situation of the losing litigant, say, the plaintiff in a
suit. Is it enough that a decision for the defendant is warranted by
the class of legal reasons even in the case in which a decision in
favor of the losing litigant could have also been warranted by the
class of legal reasons? Surely, the plaintiff will feel that the power
of the state has been unjustly imposed against him.
Of course, two outcomes could be warranted by the class of legal
reasons, but one could be more warranted than the other. Warrant
has both a threshold and an ordinal dimension. It is not the case
that outcomes are either warranted or not, and that those which are
warranted are equally warranted, while those that are not warranted
are equally unwarranted. Among those outcomes that are warranted will be some that are better supported by the class of relevant
reasons than others. So from the fact that the losing plaintiff "has
a case" (that is, a decision in his favor would be rationalizable under
the class of legal reasons), hardly leads to the conclusion that he has
a claim in justice when a decision against him is rendered." In
order to make this line of argument interesting, we have to restrict
it to cases in which a decision either way would have been equally
warranted by the class of legal reasons.
Before considering what to say about this kind of case, notice
how this line of argument could lead a thoughtful theorist to
wonder whether the best interpretation of the practice will reflect
a commitment to legal determinacy. The plaintiff says, in effect, "to
justify a decision against me it is not enough that the defendant has
" The losing plaintiff may have a valid complaint, however, when a decision in his
favor is better supported by the class of legal reasons than the decision reached in

support of the defendant's claim-even if that outcome is warranted by the class of
legal reasons. In that case, it is not sufficient that an outcome be warranted by
reason in order justifiably to compel compliance with it. If both outcomes are
warranted, then only the argument that is given greater support by the class of legal
reasons isjustifiably enforceable. The real dilemma occurs when both outcomes are
equally warranted. We consider this problem next.
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as good a case; the case on his side has to be better than mine."
Coercion can be justified only to support the best case, not a case
that is merely good enough. A plausible way of understanding the
notion of a correct answer is in precisely this way: the correct
answer is the better one. Thus, litigants may have a working
conception of the practice that commits them to the view that there
are correct answers to legal disputes; otherwise, the exercise of
coercion against them lacks justification. This is one kind of reason
a theorist might have for trying to understand adjudication as being
78
committed to determinate outcomes.
Getting back to the issue before us: we are imagining a case in
which decisions for either the plaintiff or the defendant is equally
warranted by the set of legal reasons. What can we say to the losing
plaintiff in such a case that could justify (to her) the use of coercion
to force her compliance (if necessary)? Would it help matters if a
decision against her was the predictable outcome? Predictability will
not do all the work we need. Initially, the original defense of
coercion based on the predictability of outcomes was not intended
to apply to each and every case; instead, it was intended to justify
the general use of force. All that was required was that outcomes
be predictable enough to provide guidance and allow individuals to
conform their behavior to the law. The argument did not require
that each outcome be predictable with certainty, and the decision in
our example may not have been.
For the sake of argument, suppose that the plaintiff's loss was
predictable by her. In that case, she would not have been justified
in forming any expectations of winning the suit. If her claim is that
the decision against her is unjust because it frustrates expectations
she has about winning, the following response is appropriate: her
expectations are not well-grounded, and so frustrating them is not
unjustified. This suggests that whether predictability of outcome is
helpful to fend off the charge of injustice depends in part on the
source of her claim of unjust treatment.
The plaintiff's claim, after all, may not be that her expectations
were frustrated. Instead, her claim may simply be that she has just
as solid a case as does the defendant. She wonders why the coercive
power of the law is being used against her rather than for her?

" An argument very much like this is part of the pre-Law's Empire argument
Dworkin has for the right-answer thesis. See Dworkin, supra note 22, at 28 (citing
Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1976), reprinted in DwoRKIN,
supra note 3, at 81).
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There are several points to be made at this juncture. First, it
does not follow that when the class of legal reasons is inadequate to
distinguish the plaintiffs from the defendant's case that the judge's
decision for the defendant is arbitrary in the sense of being
unreasoned or unreasonable. The charge of injustice cannot be seen
as the charge that the decision lacks ajustifying reason. More likely,
the objection is that the decision lacks a conclusory reason. But
even this may not be the case. Recall the important distinction
between the class of legal reasons and the class of reasons that the
state has authority to implement or act upon.7 ' Not every area in
which a state has authority to act has its authority fully implemented
in legislation or prior adjudication. The class of legal reasons may
fall within the set of reasons the state can implement, but it is not
identical to that set. The scope of legal reasons will be set by "a
rule of recognition" or binding sources and conventions, whereas
the scope of legitimating reasons for acting will be set by the
relevant political theory of the state.
In the event that there is a tie as judged by the class of legal
reasons, there may be other reasons a judge may be authorized to
apply. While these are not strictly speaking legal reasons, they fall
within the judge's discretionary authority to implement.
Such
reasons may ground a decision for one litigant rather than the other
even when the class of legal reasons cannot. It may be part of our
existing legal practice that when legal reasons are indeterminate a
judge has authority to appeal to applicable extralegal reasons to
resolve a dispute. Our losing plaintiff would surely have grounds
for complaint were the judge to appeal to reasons that were not
applicable to the case, or that the judge was not authorized to
consult, but she would have no complaint otherwise.80

" See supra part I.B.3.
80 Most commentators agree that something like this is what occurs in our
practices, but disagree about how to describe it. Dworkin, for one, has argued that
in appealing to such reasons,judges are actually appealing to legalstandards, not to
reasons beyond law (but nevertheless within their authority to consult). It is easy to
see how this view of the class of legal reasons fits with Dworkin's earlier views about
determinacy and right answers. Positivists, notably Raz and Coleman, argue that not
every reason ajudge may appeal to is, for that reason alone, a legal reason, that is,
one, given the criteria of legality, they must consult. Part of the difference is that
Dworkin constructs his theory of law-his account of what law is-from a theory of
adjudication, whereas positivists like Hart, Raz, and Coleman claim that the theory
of law and adjudication are distinct but related components of ajurisprudence. See
Dwowrq, supra note 3, at xii (identifying legal rights as an "institutional right to the
decision of a court in its adjudicative function"); JOSEPH RAz, THE AtTHORrTY OF
LAw: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORA= 180, 206-09 (1979);Jules L. Coleman, Negative
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Our losing plaintiff will not be satisfied, however, if in addition
to the extralegal reason adduced in favor of the defendant, there
existed similar reasons to support her case. Her concerns will
simply arise at a different level. Rather than claiming that the
outcome is unjust because she has just as good a case under the law
as the defendant does, she now claims that she also has just as good
a case given whatever other legitimate sources or reasons for
deciding a judge might have. What can we say when there is no
substantive reason of law or of political morality that distinguishes
the plaintiff's case from the defendant's?
There are at least two things we might say. In some cases, there
will exist cultural norms and practices that are shared by both
plaintiffs and defendants. These norms and conventions may make
one outcome more salient than another; in certain settings, the
community understands that the right decision is of a certain sort.
To the extent that both litigants participate in the same culture,
adopt the same practices, and follow the same norms, these
informal considerations will reinforce the decision even if there is
no binding or authorizing reason that requires it. This view reflects
the realists' conception of the commercial realm.'
This kind of response has only a limited application, however.
The more general argument is simply that in cases in which the
reasons offered are equally strong on both sides, if the judge
decided against the defendant, the defendant would have been in a
position to make the same allegation. As long as we opt for a
system of formal resolution, someone has to win and someone has
to lose. Provided that the operative political theory of the state is
that decisions based on reasoned judgment are better than no
decision at all, that it is better to have authorized decisions than no
decision, the judgment against the plaintiff can be justified. In the
end, a decision for either the plaintiff or the defendant will be
arbitrary, but it does not necessarily follow that the decision will be
utterly unreasoned or unreasonable.
Thus, the objection that
deciding against the plaintiff is unjust rings hollow.

and Positive Positivisma, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 148-49 (1982).
" See Moore & Hope, supra note 71, at 719; Moore & Sussman, supra note 71, at
560; see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 61.
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5. Determinacy and Democracy
Liberal autonomy requires stable political, social, and economic
institutions. ("Stable" does not mean "fixed.") At the same time,
liberal constraints on coercion require predictability and warrant by
dint of legal reasons. We have found no deep commitment of
In addition, although
liberalism that requires determinacy.
liberalism requires that the decisions judges reach be warranted by
the class of legal reasons, we have found no argument that requires
that those same decisions be caused by the class of legal reasons.
For all we have shown, a judge could decide cases on bases other
than the class of legal reasons provided that her decision could be
independently warranted by the class of legal reasons.8 2 Is this a
problem?
The answer is "yes" and "no." The problem does not involve the
determinacy of reasons, which is a claim aboutjustification-warrant
by reason. Indeterminacy of causes and indeterminacy of reasons
occupy different places in liberal theory. Nevertheless, liberal
political theory envisions judges acting responsibly, reaching
decisions based on the reasons that apply to them. If it happens
that judges typically decide cases on other grounds in which the
class of legal reasons plays no causal role or only an insignificant
one, then that may well mark a serious failing in the practice, not in
the theory. The theory would neither endorse nor rationalize it.
The determinacy objection draws our attention to the scope of
judicial leeway or discretion, not to the causal mechanism by which
decisions are reached.
Before closing this part of the Article, let us pursue briefly one
last argument for the claim that liberalism is committed to determinacy: the argument from democracy. The basic idea is that duly
elected legislatures can only reflect the will of the populace ifjudges
are in a suitable sense bound by democratically created legislation.
Since liberalism is ordinarily committed to some form of democratic
legislation, liberalism is committed to determinacy, as judges must
decide cases on the basis of the reasons legislatures provide. To the
extent those reasons fail to constrain judicial behavior, the very
possibility of democratic rule is in doubt.8"

See supra part I.B.4.
The argument applies primarily to statutory law and not to the common law,
where no analogous problem about democratic rule would be thought to arise.
8

"
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There are several things to note about the argument, not all of
which, strictly speaking, bear on the problem of determinacy. First,
the argument implies that judges must be constrained by the
reasons provided in legislation, not just that their decisions be
defensible by appeal to those reasons. If sound, the argument from
democratic rule is that the outcomes judges reach must be in some
significant way caused by the reasons legislation supplies. This is not
a matter of determinacy, although critics of judicial behavior would
be justified in complaining that judges who did not so regard the
class of legal reasons were acting in bad faith.
Second, even if democratic rule requires that the outcomes
judges reach be constrained by legislation, it does not follow that
judges are unconstrained when the reasons legislation provides do
not uniquely warrant outcomes. To have leeway within boundaries,
is, after all, to be constrained.
The argument of this part of the Article can be summed up very
briefly. Liberal political theory is committed to a variety of ideals
that can be confused with a commitment to determinacy. In fact,
however, liberalism is not committed to determinacy in the sense of
uniquely warranted outcomes. The existence of indeterminacy in
adjudication, therefore, poses no substantial threat to the possibility
of legitimate governance by law.
II.

OBJECTIVITY

A. The Importance of Objectivity
1. Procedural Objectivity
Recall the argument about law's objectivity:
(1) Liberal political theory is committed to objectivity.
(2) Legal practice is not in fact objective in the relevant sense.
(3) Therefore, existing practices cannot be defended on liberal
grounds.
The burden of establishing premises (1) and (2) would normally fall
to the critic who would advance premise (3). In fact, no critic has
yet met this burden for two different, but related reasons. First,
there are too many political theories that claim to be liberal, so that
as a practical matter it is simply too difficult to establish that
"political liberalism" is committed to the objectivity of adjudication.
Second, the concept of objectivity is itself quite complex, cutting
across a variety of philosophical disciplines, including epistemology,
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semantics, and metaphysics. No existing critical discussion has even
tried to address problems of objectivity in all these areas of
philosophy or examined the possible connection of each to a
distinctly liberal conception of adjudication.
Since no one who argues that liberalism is committed to a kind
of objectivity that legal practice fails to exhibit has ever presented
anything like a satisfactory argument to this effect, perhaps we
should simply suggest that until such an argument is offered there
is no reason to suppose that liberalism is committed to objectivity,
or, if it is, that the kind of objectivity to which it is committed, is
not in fact exemplified by legal practice. This is not the tack we
have chosen. Our view is that liberalism may well be committed to
objectivity, and, more importantly, that legal practice is objective in
the relevant sense. 4 To put this in terms of the argument about
objectivity sketched above, we accept premise (1), but reject premise

(2).
Before moving to a discussion of premise (2), we would like to
outline some of the reasons for thinking that liberalism is committed to objectivity. Doing so will have the additional benefit of
allowing us to introduce different senses of objectivity, while
identifying different domains in which concerns about objectivity
arise. We can distinguish between two different kinds of reasons
for thinking that legal practice is objective in an important sense.
The first of these has to do with concerns in politicalphilosophy; the
second has to do with concerns in jurisprudence. We consider both
in turn.
With respect to objectivity and liberal political theory, the
important distinction is between procedural (or epistemic) and
metaphysical objectivity. A familiar view about the foundations of
liberalism begins with the idea that, in order to endure, political
associations must find a compromise among conflicting conceptions
of value and the good, as well as among conflicting all-encompassing
philosophical theories. In a liberal political community, law allows

" We argue below that there are good reasons for ascribing objectivity to
liberalism, but the argument in this part of the Article does not depend on this
ascription being fully warranted. For even if liberalism is not, and need not be,
committed to objectivity of any sort, important aspects of legal practice are in fact
objective. The critic who claims that liberalism fails to justify existing legal practice
because that practice is not objective will be mistaken insofar as legal practice is in
fact objective. The central issue is not whether liberalism is committed to objectivity,
but whether law is objective in the appropriate sense. Thus, much of this part of the
Article is devoted to specifying the relevant conception of objectivity.
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individuals with competing conceptions to coexist (more or less)
peacefully.8 5
Legal decision-making procedures are designed to forge
compromises among conflicting interests as well as to establish
ground rules on which individuals with conflicting all-encompassing
theories or political and philosophical conceptions might agree.
These procedures are defensible, not because they provide correct
answers to legal and political disputes, but because they resolve such
disputes in a fair and impartial, that is, objective manner. This is a
rough and ready formulation of the classic conception of procedural
or epistemic objectivity. The decisions judges come to, by applying
such procedures, may or may not be correct in the sense of
corresponding to some independent set of moral or political facts;
indeed, some proponents of procedural objectivity are themselves
skeptical about the existence of such facts (though skepticism is not
a necessary condition for subscribing to procedural objectivity).
Whether motivated by skepticism or not, procedural objectivists
share the view that what justifies the outcomes of legal disputes is
the fact that judges reach them by following objective procedures.
Though objectivity is all that matters to the procedural objectivist, it matters to different procedural objectivists for different
reasons. We have already considered the case of the skeptic who is

" "Objectivity" in this procedural sense essentially involves the absence of
partiality: a procedure for reaching decisions is objective by virtue of its relative
freedom from partiality to one side or the other. We could also think of this type of
objectivity as episterological,i.e., pertaining to the cognitive procedures by which we
form beliefs about which side is entitled to a decision in its favor. In general, we
form our conceptions of what features should comprise an objective epistemic
procedure by reference to some conception of what outcomes would be correct: an
epistemologically objective procedure is a "reality-tracker." Thus, impartiality is a
mark of epistemic objectivity in adjudication because preexisting partiality to one side
or the other is not relevant to what outcome the law deems correct; impartiality helps
judicial decision-making track (legal) reality because legal reality is not partial.
("Legal reality" here means "what the law requires" not "what actually happens in
court," which may be tainted with partiality, and so not objective.) As we observe in
the text below, procedural or epistemological objectivity, though typically characterized by implicit reference to a conception of a reality-to-be-tracked, need not be
defended by reference to what is really legally correct. It can instead be defended on
the grounds that it is an impartial procedure for resolving disputes that is acceptable
to individuals wedded to conflicting claims about what is right. Procedural
objectivists need not deny that there are correct answers to political disputes, nor
need they believe that objective decision-making procedures are unconnected to those
answers. Their point is that the defense of those procedures is independent of the
relationship between the procedures and the correctness (or incorrectness) of the
answers secured by following the procedures.
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dubious about objectively correct answers to legal, moral, and
political questions. For her, objective procedures are all that she
could hope for. We can distinguish between at least two other
kinds of procedural objectivists whose commitment does not
depend on skepticism about the existence of correct answers to
pressing legal, moral, and political questions. First there are the
Hobbesians. Hobbesians see procedural objectivity as a modus
vivendi-a strategically motivated compromise among self-interested
parties.86 Having decisions reached by objective procedures is the
only way to forge compromise among individuals with conflicting
interests and philosophical conceptions. Objective decision
procedures can be defended on Hobbesian grounds even if there
are correct answers to most pressing legal, moral, and political
questions. All that is required to support agreement on objective
procedures are (1) sufficient disagreement about what those answers
are, and (2) a collective interest in mutually advantageous cooperative endeavors.
We can now distinguish Rawlsians from Hobbesians. Like
Hobbesians, Rawlsians need not be skeptics about the existence of
correct answers to pressing moral, legal, and political questions.
Unlike Hobbesians, however, Rawlsians believe that there are
substantive grounds of political morality, not merely of self-interest
or expediency, for agreeing to objective decision procedures;
Rawlsians believe that liberalism requires that objective procedures
be employed to settle disputes in a pluralistic setting. 7 In sum,
procedural objectivity can be defended on skeptical grounds (as in
the case of James Buchanan"8 ), substantive grounds of political
morality (as in the work of the later Rawls89 ), or strategic grounds
(as in Hobbes 90 ).
In contrast to procedural objectivity, we can distinguish
metaphysical objectivity. According to metaphysical objectivity, there
are correct answers to pressing legal, political, and moral questions:
answers whose correctness is independent of people's beliefs about
them and are, in a sense to be clarified below, objectively correct.
The legitimacy of authority depends, not on judges following
8

See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN

8

228 (E.P.

Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651).

" See e.g., RAWLS, supra note 16, at 38.
8 See generallyJAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LmERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY
AND LEVIATHAN (1975).
89
See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 137.

90 See HOBBES, supra note 86, at 107-08.
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objective procedures, but rather on the accuracy of their decisions
in reporting objective legal facts.9 Recall that a "legal fact" is
simply any statement of what the law requires on some point: for
example, "it is a legal fact that Coleman's failure to inspect
constitutes negligence just in case it is true that as a matter of law
Coleman's failure to inspect really does constitute negligence."
Adjudication is objective in the metaphysical sense when the
outcome of the adjudication coincides with the relevant legal fact.
Some liberal political theories accept the view that the justification
of coercion depends in part on the state's having an adjudicatory
system whose outcomes track the objective legal facts; indeed,
92
natural lawyers typically hold such a view.
To see why political liberalism might be committed to objectivity
in either the procedural or the metaphysical sense, notice what
subjectivity would consist in. Adjudication is subjective in the
procedural sense just in case judges reach decisions by relying on
their feelings of bias and partiality toward one side or the other.
Adjudication is subjective in the metaphysical sense when something
is a legal fact by virtue of the individual judge believing it to be a
legal fact. Were adjudication subjective in either sense, there would
be little reason to suppose that a citizen would have a prima facie
duty or moral reason to comply with the judgments of officials.
Similarly, it would be hard to see how the use of coercion to enforce
such decisions could bejustified. The liberal conception of political
obligation and the conditions under which coercion is justified both
support the view that liberalism is committed to either epistemic or
metaphysical objectivity.
The above arguments for objectivity are drawn from normative
considerations. The view that legal practice has an important
objectivist component need not rely entirely on normative considerations, however. For it is part of our ordinary conception of
adjudication that judges seek to resolve disputes by determining
what result the law requires. What the law requires, in turn, is
thought to be independent of how judges regard the law in the
sense that judges and lawyers can be wrong about what the law
requires, and in the additional sense that adjudication is about
discovering the law's requirements. This suggests that the ordinary
conception of legal facts treats them as being objective in some
91

See infra part IIA.2.

2 See, e.g., Michael Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424, 2477
(1992).

1993]

DETERMINACY, OBJECTIVIT, AND AUTHORITY

599

sense. Our goal is to specify that sense of objectivity.
One consequence of defending objectivity on liberal normative
grounds is that if liberalism's critics are correct in arguing that legal
practice is not objective in either the procedural or the metaphysical
sense, then current legal practice cannot be defended on liberal
grounds. If our current practices are to be defended, we will have
to look to other political conceptions. If, however, the claim about
objectivity is motivated by considerations of analytic jurisprudence
rather than substantive political theory, then the failure of legal
facts to be metaphysically objective would imply something else:
not that liberal legal practice is indefensible, but rather that our
ordinary understanding of legal practice is deeply mistaken. If it
were the case that the objects referred to in the domain of legal
discourse were not objective, we would need to provide another
explanation of our practice of referring to legal facts as if they were
objective, when in fact they are not.
As our mission here is to uncover the relevant conception of
objectivity, we do not assume adjudication will turn out to be
objective in any sense. Some sort of metaphysical objectivity may be
a theoretical or conceptual commitment of our discourse about law,
but upon closer inspection it may well turn out that our discourse
is misleading, and that our apparent commitment to objectivity is
based on a "mistake." John Mackie famously held a similar view
about our ethical discourse.9"
That is, when we make moral
judgments we talk as if moral facts were part of the fabric of the
universe in the same way that tables and chairs are. Our ethical
discourse is based on a commitment to this kind of objectivity of
moral facts. Thus, because moral facts are not objective in this
sense, Mackie argues that our ethical views are based on a mistake.

94

93 See J.L. MAcKIE, ETHICs: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 40 (1977).

' More precisely, Mackie agrees with the realist that ethical discourse is essentially
cognitive, i.e., it aims to describe and state facts. But for various reasons, Mackie
argues there are no such facts. Thus, ethical discourse is systematically in error
because it purports to describe and state facts where there are none. See id. at 35.
In metaethics, this doctrine is called "error theory." Most who agree with Mackie on
the metaphysical point-that there are no moral facts-disagree with him on the
semantic point-that ethical discourse is essentially cognitive. While it is hard to
understand the point of a putatively fact-stating discourse that never succeeds in
stating any facts, ethical discourse seems to playsome important role in our lives. The
noncognitivist suggests that we look for that role not in any ability of ethical language
to state facts, but rather in its ability to express certain sorts of important attitudes and
feelings.
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The same may be true of our legal discourse. We talk as if some
legal decisions are right whereas others are not, and not just
because ajudge so regards them. This suggests that judgments are
not merely reports of ajudge's preference, but that there is a sense
in which legal facts that make such judgments right or wrong are,
or can be, objective. It is perfectly possible that we are wrong, our
discourse misleading. We cannot assume that our discourse has it
right. That is what needs to be argued.
It is important, at this point, not to confuse objectivity with
determinacy." To say that the law is determinate is to say that
there are correct answers to legal disputes. An answer is correct if
it coincides with the relevant legal fact of the matter. Thus, the
judge's ruling that Coleman's failure to inspect is negligent is
correct if the legal fact of the matter is that Coleman's failure to
inspect constitutes negligence. The determinacy thesis claims in
effect that in all cases, there are legal facts-of-the-matter: the point
of adjudication is to reach decisions that coincide with what those
facts are.
The worry about objectivity concerns the status of those legal
facts-when there are such facts. Are they facts because a judge or
most lawyers would regard them as such, or are they facts independent of whether judges or lawyers so regard them? In this Section
of the Article, we presume that, to the extent that the law is
determinate (as it is, for example, in easy cases), the correct answers
must be objectively correct; our concern, however, is with what sense
of objectivity is at issue here. Of course, indeterminacy is still
compatible with legitimate authority for the reasons given in the
first half of this Article. 96 But to the extent that the law is determinate, objectivity (of some sort still to be specified) is required.
To accept indeterminacy, then, is to allow that sometimes there
are no legal facts of the matter: e.g., it is not a legal fact that
Coleman's failure to inspect constitutes negligence and it is not a
legal fact that Coleman's failure to inspect does not constitute
negligence. To accept (metaphysical) subjectivity is to allow that
where there are such facts what makes them so is that judges or
lawyers so regard them.

" The natural tendency to conflate objectivity and determinacy stems from the
fact that we sometimes say that the law is objectivejust in case it is largely determinative of outcomes in individual cases. In spite of this tendency, and perhaps because
of it, we need to distinguish the claims of determinacy from those of objectivity.
' See supra part I.B.

1993]

DETERMINACY, OBJECTIVIT, AND AUTHORITY

601

While we are on the subject of exploring the relationships
between determinacy and objectivity, it is worth noting that there
is an important connection between indeterminacy and subjectivity,
a connection that raises a serious concern about the cogency of the
critical attack on liberalism.
Liberalism's critics reject both
determinacy and objectivity, and therefore accept both indeterminacy and subjectivity. The problem is that one cannot coherently
maintain both indeterminacy and subjectivity. Once one accepts
subjectivity, one is committed to the view that legal facts are as
judges regard them, because they regard them as such. Since
correct answers are those that correspond to the facts and the facts
are simply those that the judge regards as such, there must be
determinate answers to all legal disputes. Thus, because subjectivity
entails determinacy, no critic of liberalism can coherently maintain
both subjectivity and indeterminacy. This means that when
liberalism's critics claim that law is indeterminate, they must really
have in mind an objectivist account of legal facts!
In what follows, we reject the procedural conception of
objectivity in favor of the metaphysical one, at least as a first

approximation. We are attempting to provide an analytic jurisprudence, that is, a philosophic account of our practices-including
adjudication-and our pretheoretic view is that legal discourse
9
presupposes a form of metaphysical objectivity. 7
With these preliminaries out of the way, let us now turn our
attention to the second premise.
2. Metaphysics and Semantics
Claims about the objectivity of law can be cast in either
metaphysical or semantic terms. That is, they might be expressed
as claims about legal discourse (semantics) or about the objects

referred to by the discourse (metaphysics). While we focus on the
metaphysical side of the divide, it will prove helpful to understand
the relationship between objectivity in metaphysics and semantics.
We begin with metaphysics. In its simplest and most basic form,
9
As we noted before, it may well happen that there is no satisfactory conception
of metaphysical objectivity that applies to law. If that turns out to be the case, legal
facts would not be objective, but subjective. But it would not follow, and this is the
important point, that adjudication would be subjective, for it might yet be procedurally or epistemically objective. That form of objectivity is compatible both with
metaphysical subjectivity about legal facts and with our liberal tradition regarding the
terms of legitimate coercion.
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metaphysics is concerned with "what there is."98 Metaphysical
realism9 9 is the view that what there is-the world-is independent
of human minds in two senses. First, the existence and character of
the world is not simply the extension of human mind (metaphysical
or constitutive independence). Second, the existence and character
of the world does not depend on the evidentiary tools available to
us for gaining access to it (epistemic independence). For the time
being, we shall speak simply of the "independence" of the world
from evidence and belief, and that because of its conception of the
independence of the world, metaphysical realism is committed to
the "strong objectivity" of "what there is."
Metaphysical antirealism denies that the world is independent
in one or both senses, though the epistemic sense has been the most
important in the twentieth century ("what there is" depends on what
we take there to be). If realism entails strong objectivity, then it
would be natural to assume that antirealism entails subjectivity. But
that would be a mistake, or so we will argue. The view that we want
to press below is that one can reject metaphysical realism and yet
embrace objectivity.
Note two further points. First, one can be a metaphysical realist
about certain objects in certain domains (midsize physical objects,
e.g., tables and chairs) and an antirealist about the objects in other
domains (e.g., moral properties or the theoretical entities in
scientific theories). Second, metaphysical realism typically involves
more than a view about the objectivity of the world. Crispin Wright
has helpfully characterized metaphysical realism as the conjunction
of both a modest and a presumptuous thesis.1 00 The modesty
derives from its view of the world as independent of our experiences of it and our beliefs about it. The presumptuousness derives
from its view that, in spite of this independence, individuals can
come to know important truths about the world, including those

'8There are reasons and contexts in which it makes sense to distinguish
metaphysics from ontology; in our usage here, metaphysics encompasses ontology.
'The reader should not confuse Legal Realism which is the name of a
jurisprudential school with metaphysical or semantic realism which are theses about
the nature of what there is and meaning respectively. Metaphysical realists believe
that there is a way the world is that is independent of human beliefs and minds,
whereas Legal Realists sometimes seem to believe, among other things, that legal facts
are what judges determine them to be. So one reason for insisting that the reader
keep the distinction in mind is that, though the two views share the word "realism,"
they stand for nearly opposite claims with respect to the status of (legal) facts.
100
See CRISPIN WRGHT, REALISM, MEANING AND TRUTH 1-2 (1987) (stating that
"[r]ealism is a mixture of modesty and presumption").
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concerning its deep structure. Thus, the metaphysical modesty of
realism is typically conjoined with an epistemological presumptuousness: yes, the world is the way it is independent of our beliefs and
evidence; nevertheless, we can come to know things about the way
the world really is.
We need now another set of preliminary distinctions between
realism and antirealism in semantics. Semantic theories provide
accounts of what meaning itself consists of-that is, what kind of
property it is-as well as how sentences (or words) get their
meaning. Semantic realists make two claims. The first is that the
meaning of a sentence is given by its truth conditions; the second
is that those truth conditions can themselves be evidence-transcendent. Thus, evidence-transcendence is a central element of both
metaphysical and semantic realism.
Antirealism in semantics is characterized by its denial of either
or both of these claims. So a semantic antirealist might deny that
meaning is given by truth conditions, or she might deny that
meaning is evidence-transcendent. An antirealist can accept that the
meaning of sentences is given by truth conditions and deny that
truth-conditions can be evidence-transcendent." 1 Or an antirealist
can deny that meaning is given by truth conditions. Instead, for
example, she could argue that the meaning of a sentence is given by
its "assertibility conditions" (i.e., the conditions under which it can
be asserted); this is the approach many semanticists who have been
influenced by Wittgenstein have taken.10
The fact remains,
however, that most antirealists deny both of the central tenets of
semantic realism.
Before moving on, we have to say something about conventionalism in its relationship to both realism and antirealism. There are
many senses of conventionalism, but there is one usage of "conventionalism" that is common to both realism and antirealism. We take
note of this usage because failing to distinguish it from other senses
of conventionalism invites the confusing and mistaken view that all
theories of meaning are ultimately conventional.
Choosing a
particular word to stand for something is conventional. We choose
101

This is a recurring theme in Crispin Wright's form of antirealism. See, e.g.,
Crispin Wright, Realism, Antirealism,Irrealism, Quasi-Realism,in 12 MIDWEST STUD. IN
PHIL. 25, 27 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1988) (stating that antirealism "is exactly the
view that the notion of truth cannot intelligibly be evidentially unconstrained... [but

that an antirealist has] no motive to forswear all use of the notion of truth").
'o2 See, e.g., KRUPKE, supra note 32, at 74.
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the word "water" to refer to something when we could have just as
easily made up another word to serve the same function, say,
"wetski." Languages are always conventional in this sense, but this
sort of conventionality is independent of the realist/antirealist
divide. For the realist, once we use the word "water" to stand for
something that has the chemical property of being H 20, the
meaning of water is fixed by the way the world is. The word "water"
cannot be correctly employed in some other way to refer to objects
that do not have the appropriate chemical structure. In contrast,
for the antirealist, water isjust whatever the community of languageusers permits us to say it is, whether or not it has the property,
H2O- 10
Semantic realism presupposes metaphysical realism. The claim
that meaning is fixed by the way the world is (semantic realism)
presupposes that there is a way that the world is independent of
human evidence and belief (metaphysical realism). Metaphysical
realism, however, does not entail or presuppose semantic realism.
One can believe that the character of the world is independent of
our epistemic access to it, but that the nature of meaning itself is
not. In such a case, semantic antirealists would provide us with a
picture of language that would be inadequate for depicting the
world as the metaphysical realist conceives it; not surprisingly, then,
it is common for metaphysical realists to be semantic realists.
Given our concerns regarding objectivity, realism is important
because of its relationship to objectivity. If one wanted to establish
the objectivity of legal discourse, then one might be inclined to
defend a semantic realist's perspective of the legal domain. And if
one wanted to defend the objectivity of the facts or the objects
referred to in the legal domain, then one natural way of doing that
would be to defend a metaphysical realist conception of legal facts.
Among contemporary jurisprudes, Michael Moore defends realism
10 4
about both legal facts and the semantics of legal discourse.
10 The confusion is similar to another confusion that applies to metaphysics. It
is common to accept realism about tables and chairs, which means that tables and
chairs exist independently of human beliefs about them. But we have heard many
otherwise intelligent people deny the objectivity of tables and chairs on the grounds
that people construct tables and chairs. Neither exists in nature as a natural kind.
They are constructed by humans. But the metaphysical realist's claim is not that
tables and chairs are casally independent of human behavior, but rather that they are
epistemically and constitutively independent of human minds.
'0 See Moore, supra note 92, at 2469-70.
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There are, however, serious problems for all forms of semantic
realism, whether in the legal domain or not, and there are specific
problems with pursuing a metaphysical realist conception of legal
facts. We take up some of the problems facing realism about legal
facts below. For now we want to draw the reader's attention to
familiar concerns about semantic realism in all domains of discourse. The key arguments here are associated with Kripkenstein,
Michael Dummett, and Crispin Wright. 5
One way of understanding the semantic skepticism associated
with Kripkenstein is to view it as an attempt to undermine what we
might call semantic Platonism: the view that meaning is given by
facts that exist independently of the semantic practices and beliefs
Kripkenstein is not alone in this effort. Dummett's
of humans.'
influential essays have raised doubts about the ability of semantic
realism to explain "meaning acquisition" and "manifestation,"'
and Crispin Wright has formulated a novel and important objection
to realist semantics that is based on the normativity of meaning (of
which Kripkenstein's argument may be just a special case).0 8
Here is the basic idea behind Wright's objection.'
According to the realist, the meaning of a sentence is given by
its truth conditions, the set of conditions that must obtain in order
for it to be true. Sentences, for the realist, may be true even if we
are unable to grasp their truth or to have access to it. On the other
hand, it is central to our concept of meaning that it play a normal0 Purely for reasons of philosophical currency, not cogency, we concentrate on
Kripkenstein and Wright.
'06 See WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 10.
107
See generally MICHAEL DUMMETr, TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS (1978)
(discussing the philosophical interrelationship between meaning and understanding).
McDowell, in criticizing Dummett, identifies a core of shared assumptions between
Dummett and Platonists and proposes a new way to move beyond both. See John
McDowell, Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding, in MEANING AND
UNDERSTANDING 225, 242 (Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse eds., 1981)
(proposing that the issue ofunderstandingbe viewed in epistemological terms rather
than at the phenomenological level).
o See WRIGHT, supra note 100, at 23-26.
We do not mean to slight Dummett, though we think Wright's argument is
particularly meaningful in the legal context. Dummett argued that the semantic
realist will have trouble explaining both how we can acquire new meanings, and how
we can manifest our understanding of a meaning, when meaning, for the realist, is
given by possibly evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. See DUMMETT, supra note
107, at 420-30. That is, the dilemma facing the realist is that if it is possible that we
could never detect the conditions that would constitute the meaning of a sentence,
how then can we acquire this meaning (i.e., come to understand it) or manifest our
grasp of the meaning (i.e., display our understanding of it)?
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tive role by constraining the uses to which sentences can be
legitimately put. For example, the meaning of "the cat is on the
mat" constrains the uses to which the sentence can be put; thus, it
prevents us from "correctly" using it to refer to a pig being on my
bed."'
But if the meaning of a sentence is given by its truth
conditions in a world independent of our evidentiary capacities to
access it, then how can the meaning constrain our use of it? How
can we be constrained by something possibly beyond our access?1 1 '
In short, meaning constrains usage. But meaning that is given
by facts that we may have no access to cannot constrain our use in
the appropriate way. Semantic realism has the problem of explaining the way in which meaning can be normative, i.e., how it can
constrain usage. The antirealist semantics of the Kripkensteinian
communitarian, for example, do not face this problem. If the
meaning is set by what the community of language users will allow
Leiter to assert, then the meaning of "the cat is on the mat" may
not prevent Leiter from using it to refer to a pig being on the bed,
if that is an allowable assertion under the prevailing practice. So it
is the practice of the community of language users with which each
2
language user is adequately familiar that constrains usage."
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the application of semantic
realism to legal discourse. As we noted earlier, it is (logically)
possible to accept metaphysical realism but reject semantic realism.
However, we also noted that if one took this tack, one would be
committed to the odd view that the discourse in question could not
describe the world as the metaphysical realist conceives it. Thus,
semantic and metaphysical realism typically go hand in hand. The
considerations that invite us to abandon semantic realism in a
domain of discourse appear to suggest that we abandon metaphysical realism in that domain as well. And if we give up both semantic
and metaphysical realism, does not that imply that we have

110 That is, we cannot correctly use the sentence "the cat is on the mat" to refer to
a pig on my bed under normal circumstances, i.e., where I am trying to assert a true
proposition.
. Or, as Nietzsche put the same point regarding Kant's attempt to give a
metaphysical foundation to morality: "[H]ow could something unknown obligate us?"
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 463, 485
(Walter Kaufmann trans., 1954) (1888).
1 A further question, beyond the scope of the present inquiry, is how
conventions or practices constrain. How does the mere convergence of behavior (as
in a convention) impose normative constraints?

1993]

DETERMINACY, OBJECTIVIT, AND AUTHORITY

607

abandoned all hope of providing an objective conception of the
relevant discourse or of the objects referred to by the discourse as
objective?
Realism entails objectivity, but objectivity does not entail
realism. Antirealism, in other words, does not entail subjectivity.
We intend to defend a form of antirealist objectivity. But how can
a position that denies that the world is independent of the ways in
which we happen to construe it be compatible with objectivity? Our
task is to show how a discourse and the objects referred to in the
discourse can be objective even if the domain of discourse does not
invite a realist interpretation. That is the task to which we now
turn.
3. Objectivity and Subjectivity
We begin by attending more carefully to what it means to talk
about "objectivity" and "subjectivity." Consider, in this regard, the
distinction between what "seems right" (with respect to the truth of
some judgment) and what "is right" (i.e., what really is the case)." 3
Subjectivism is the view that denies the distinction. To say that
something is right under subjectivism is to say that it seems right to
me, no more, no less. We might call this doctrine Pure Protagoreanism,1 14 since it literally suggests that each individual is the
measure of all things."'
At the other end of the continuum from subjectivism is the
doctrine we will call "strong objectivism." According to this view,
what "seems right" never determines what "is right." According to
the strong metaphysical objectivist, what is the case about the world
never depends on what humans take there to be (even under ideal
epistemic conditions). According to the strong semantic objectivist,
the meaning of a sentence never depends on what any speaker or
community of speakers takes it to mean. We will call strong
11 For a more complete development of these distinctions, see Brian Leiter,
Objectivity and the Problems ofJurisprudence,72 TEX. L. REV. 187, 192-96 (1993) (book
review). We also ignore here certain philosophical details and difficulties that are
taken up in Leiter's article.
11 This doctrine is an allusion to Plato's Theaetetus. See PLATO, THEAETETUS
*152a, *166a-b.
"- What, someone might wonder, is the meaning or content of the thought, "It
seems right to me that X means Y"? If subjectivism is true, then it must only be: "It
seems right to me that it seems right to me that X mean Y." But what, then, is the
content of that thought? Clearly, an infinite regress is in the offing. This might be

one reason-one among several, no doubt-for rejecting subjectivism about meaning.
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objectivism the "Platonic" position." 6 Thus, at one end of the
subjectivism/objectivism divide we have Protagorean subjectivism;
at the other end we have Platonic objectivism.
"Minimal objectivity"" 7 occupies some of the space between
these two extremes. According to minimal objectivity, what seems
right to the majority of the community determines what is right. As
regards the theory of meaning, this is simply a form of "linguistic
communitarianism": how most speakers are disposed to use a word
fixes its meaning. Minimal objectivity preserves the essential
anthropocentrism of the Protagorean doctrine in that neither the
meaning of sentences in the discourse nor the metaphysical status
of the objects referred to by those sentences are independent of
human practices with regard to them. But it introduces an element
of objectivity that consists in taking from the individual the measure
of all things and placing that power in the community as a whole.
According to minimal objectivity, individuals are not the measure
of all things, but their collective or convergent practices are.
Because it denies the epistemic transcendence of meaning and
ontology, minimal objectivity is essentially antirealist; because it
denies that the world is just how any particular person takes it to be,
it is essentially objectivist.
Whether it is a powerful enough
conception of objectivity to allay our fears about the subjectivity of
adjudication remains to be seen.
We now have two conceptions of objectivity that may be
applicable to the legal domain: strong and minimal objectivity.
Both conceptions of objectivity play a role in various of our nonlegal practices. Strong objectivity, for example, figures in our
conception of scientific inquiry. We view scientists as trying to
uncover the way the world really is; and the way the world is is
independent of anyone's beliefs or theories about it, all of which
could turn out to be false." 18
On the other hand, there are several predicates that are
naturally interpreted as being minimally objective. Being fashionable is an obvious example." 9 Something is (objectively) fashion116

See PLATO, PHAEDO *74a-75b; PLATO, REPUBLIC *475-80, *508d-e; PLATO,
SYMPOsIUM *21la-b.
117See Leiter, supra note 113, at 192-93.
1168
This may even be the way in which scientists see their practice, but interestingly, it is not the only way philosophers of science see scientific practice and its
metaphysical commitments. In this regard, see LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND

RELATIVISM
xii (1990).
19

' See Leiter, supra note 113, at 195.

1993]

DETERMINACY, OBJECTIVITY, AND AUTHORITY

609

able provided the majority of the community treats it as such, not
otherwise. It is impossible to conceive of the property of being
fashionable in any other way. It makes no sense, for example, to say
that a style of dress is fashionable and mean by that nothing more
than that I alone regard it as such. At the same time, it makes no
sense to say that whether a style of dress is fashionable is altogether
independent of how people regard it. So being fashionable is
neither purely subjective nor strongly objective; it is minimally
objective.
Just to complete the picture, it is also obvious that some
predicates naturally admit of a subjective interpretation. A good
example is tastiness 20 When we try to make sense of someone's
claim that a certain ice cream flavor tastes good, it is natural to
understand her to be claiming that it tastes good to her. It makes
no sense to understand her to be asserting that it tastes good
independently of how anyone regards it as tasting; and it makes only
slightly more sense to understand her to be claiming that it tastes
good because most people would so regard it.
These various conceptions of objectivity and subjectivity all play
a role in our accounts and understandings of different features of
our experience. It is simply false, and not merely unhelpful, to
claim that "everything is subjective." If our theories are supposed
to illuminate our practices, then it is worth noting that much of our
discourse employs predicates that invite objectivist interpretations.
The only meaningful or worthwhile endeavor is to try to determine
which domains of discourse admit of objective and subjective
accounts. Which conception of objectivity or subjectivity applies to
a particular domain? Which applies to the legal domain?
As important as it is not to conflate concerns about objectivity
with concerns about determinacy, it is equally important not to
conflate theories of metaphysical objectivity with general semantic
claims. The former are concerned with the degree of mind- and
evidence-independence of facts of various kinds;12 1 the latter give
an account of meaning in some or all regions of discourse. For
example, minimal objectivism about moral facts (the view that the
120 See id. at 194.

. We can think of theories of semantic objectivity-theories about the objectivity
of meaning-as a subset of theories of metaphysical objectivity. Instead of being
concerned with mind- and evidence-independence of facts in general, theories of
semantic objectivity are concerned with the degree of mind- and evidence-independence of semantic facts (or facts about meaning).
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community determines what is morally right and wrong) is a
metaphysical view-a view about the status of moral facts. Though it
may be a plausible metaphysical view, it is obviously not a very
plausible account of the semantics of moral discourse. In moral
discourse-in our discussions and debates about moral issues-we do
not justify our judgments about the morality and immorality of
various acts by averting to the fact that "most people around here
believe it to be so." The surface of our moral discourse seems to
aspire to higher forms of objectivity. What this means is that even
if minimal objectivity provides the best interpretation of the way in
which moral facts are regarded, it does not provide a particularly
plausible semantics of moral discourse. Even if moral facts are fixed
by community practices, the discourse of moral argument invites a
somewhat different interpretation. It is no part of the practice of
making and defending moral judgments that those who do so are
satisfied to show that the bulk of the members of a community
regard conduct as good, bad, right, wrong, and so on.
Consequently, a philosopher who thinks that moral facts are
122
subjective or minimally objective (as a metaphysical matter) still
owes some account of the semantics of our moral discourse: what
do we mean when we purport to defend moral claims without
averting to what the speaker or the community of speakers takes to
be true. Recent philosophical work has shown that there can be an
account of the semantics of moral discourse and its purported
claims to strong forms of objectivity ("what the Serbs are doing in
Bosnia is really wrong, whether or not they know it") that is
compatible with denying comparably strong forms of (metaphysical)
objectivity. 12 There may be no moral facts, but we can still have
an account of the meaning of ethical discourse which proceeds as
though there were.
Unsurprisingly, there are cases where the same theory of
objectivity will suffice for both the metaphysics and the semantics.
What is fashionable is determined by what the bulk of the community regards as fashionable. Moreover, in discussions about what is
fashionable, we can properly avert to majority opinion as a gauge

" Our locution here may not be standard: a philosopher who thought moral
facts were metaphysically subjective in the sense defined above might prefer to say
that there are no moral facts at all, suggesting that the very concept of a moral fact
presupposes some form of objectivity.
123
See ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGs: A THEORY OF NORMATIvE
JUDGMENT 153-250 (1990) (providing a seminal treatment of this issue).
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for the correctness or incorrectness of particular judgments of
fashionability. As we suggested above, however, even if moral facts
are-metaphysically-subjective or minimally objective, it is not part
of meaningful moral discourse to establish the immorality of torture
by averting to the speaker's or the community's dislike of it.
As with moral discourse, there may be reasons to think that
skeptical positions regarding the metaphysics of legal facts (e.g.,
subjectivism or minimal objectivism) may have to be conjoined with
different views of legal semantics. Judges, after all, do offer reasons
for their decisions, and in the course of doing so seem to aspire to
certain forms of objectivity that are stronger than subjectivism and
minimal objectivism-a point exploited to good effect by Ronald
24
Dworkin over the past twenty-five years.'
Averting to the semantics of legal discourse as a way of
establishing metaphysical claims has been a large part of Dworkin's
arsenal of weapons used against his enemy, the legal positivist. Here
are two examples. First, in arguing that principles and policies
other than legal rules are binding legal standards, Dworkin claims
that judges do not appear to write or speak as if they treated such
standards as extralegal. Then, in defending the claim that there are
right answers to legal disputes, Dworkin argues that judges argue as
if there were right answers even if they do not agree about what
those answers are. In both cases, Dworkin employs features of the
discourses as a way of suggesting or establishing claims about the
12 5
status of the objects referred to in the discourse.
124 See e.g., Dworkin, Model of Rules, supra note 27, at 14, reprinted in DWoRKIN,

supra note 3, at 14.
125 Coleman, for one, is a positivist who has never found this line of argument
persuasive, since it rests on a philosophically dubious form of argument, employing
features of the semantics of legal discourse to establish a metaphysical claim about
the objects referred to by the discourse.
The analogy with the case of ethics is again apt and likely to be illuminating.
Many writers who agree on the metaphysical question (about the status of moral facts)
disagree on the semantics. Ayer, Gibbard, Mackie, and Stevenson are all metaphysical
antiobjectivists about morality (i.e., ours is a world without moral facts), and they all
disagree, in some cases dramatically, on the best account of the meaning of moral
language and moral discourse. See A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LoGIC (1952);
GIBBARD, supra note 123; MAcKiE, supra note 93; CARLES STEVENSON, ETHICS AND
LANGUAGE (1944). We think it more fruitful to begin with the metaphysical
question-what there is-and deal with the semantics afterward. Semantics always has
the option of revisionism (i.e., maybe the pretensions of language cannot be realized,
and so must be revised), but revisionism in metaphysics, as a picture of what there is
and its status, seems less promising.
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The concepts of minimal and strong objectivity are far from
unfamiliar in jurisprudence, even if they have not been discussed
previously in these terms. Minimal objectivity is very close to
conventionalism, and most contemporary legal positivists (Coleman
is an exception) have favored some or other version of it. Strong
objectivity is associated with the natural law tradition and most
12
recently with the works of Michael Moore and David Brink.
Both minimal and strong objectivity are subject to important
criticisms, especially when construed as semantic theories. Some of
these criticisms are quite general; others are more limited to one or
the other as a conception of objectivity in law. In taking up these
objections, we want not only to raise doubts about the applicability
of either to law; we want as well to motivate consideration of yet
another conception of objectivity that is largely unfamiliar to legal
scholarship, modest objectivity.
B. Setting the Stagefor Modest Objectivity

1. Problems with Strong Objectivity
Following Crispin Wright, we have characterized metaphysical
realism as the conjunction of two premises: one affirming the
independence of facts from our epistemic access to them (their
independence from human evidence and belief); the second
127
affirming the possibility of securing knowledge of such facts.
The most pressing problem with metaphysical realism about legal
facts has to do with the tension between these two claims. If the
existence and nature of legal facts are independent of what all
lawyers and judges believe (or might have reason to believe), then
how do judges gain access to them? Put differently, what reason is
there for thinking that conventional adjudicatory practices involve
reliable mechanisms for identifying legal facts?
The realist about legal facts might simply deny that there is a
problem here. She might offer two responses. First, she might say
that it does not matter whether judges have access to the legal facts
of the matter. Legitimate authority depends only on there being
correct answers to legal disputes, not on any judge's ability to access
126

See generally David 0. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial
Review, 17 PHiL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (1988); Michael M. Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory of
Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REv. 279 (1985).
127See WRIGHT, supra note 100, at 1-2.
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them. But this ought to be unconvincing. The fact that there are
right answers would count for very little if judges were invariably to
come to the wrong conclusions about them. Why would anyone
have a reason to comply with the law's demands if there were no
reason to believe that the decisions judges arrive at were generally
correct? In order for coercion to be justified, it must be employed
to enforce answers that are generally correct, not just ones judges
happen to reach. So there is no escaping the problem of access.
128
Metaphysical realists about legal facts, like Michael Moore,
are well aware that this answer will not do. Instead, they offer a
second kind of response: judges can have access to the correct
answers to legal disputes in the same way that ordinary citizens can
have access to ordinary facts of the matter. The problem is
somewhat different in the case of judging, however. The evidence
on which ajudge bases his beliefs about what is the correct answer
to a dispute is presented in a special way through an adjudicatory
process. Our question, therefore, becomes what reason do we have
for thinking that the adjudicatory practices we have developed will
yield judgments or beliefs that accurately track what the law in fact
(objectively) requires?
If we think of an adjudicatory process as the mechanism through
which a judge forms justtfied beliefs about what the law requires, then
the question becomes what conception of the adjudicatory process
will ensure that those justified beliefs are also true, that they
coincide with what the law actually requires. Philosophically, we
would put the question this way: what epistemology of judging is
appropriate to a metaphysical realist conception of legal facts?
The leading metaphysical realist about legal facts, Michael
Moore, is a coherentist about justification. Justified beliefs about
what the law requires of officials are those that cohere in an
appropriate way with the set of beliefs about the law that the judge
already has. Beliefs cohere to the extent that they are, for example,
consistent and display a maximum of inferential support for each
other. 129 The adjudicatory process, then, is best seen as the
vehicle through which judges try to provide an account of the law
128 Although we say, "like Michael Moore," Moore and David Brink (as well as
some natural lawyers) are probably the only adherents of the view that legal facts are
strongly objective. See supra note 126 and accompanying text; cf Leiter, supra note

113, at 201-02.
2 See LAURENCE BONJOUR, THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 93-101

(1985).
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that makes the law's demands cohere in the relevant way. The
outcome a judge should give in a particular case is the one that
maximally coheres, and, provided the judge has gone about things
in the right way, she is justified in believing that the outcome she
reaches is what the law really requires. Coherence in our beliefs is
supposed to track the strongly objective requirements of the
30

law.1

The problem is that coherence as an account of justified belief
(i.e., as an epistemology of judging) is a poor match for metaphysical realism regarding the content of legal judgments and the status
of legal facts. Why should the fact that a set of beliefs cohere for
ajudge (or for us) be a reason for thinking that those beliefs track
the way the world really is? This is just the familiar philosophical
worry that in the absence of a mechanism through which a coherent
set of beliefs comes to be connected to facts about the world that
are independent of those beliefs, there are no grounds for believing
that justified beliefs, so conceived, track the way the world is. The
problem is not eliminated even on the assumption that the world is
itself coherent or consistent. For why should the kind of coherence
among our beliefs (which is justificatory or inferential) correspond
to the consistency or coherence of things in the world? Coherence
among beliefs has nothing to do with the kind of coherence that
objects in the world are thought to exhibit.' 3'
130There are numerous formulations of the requirements of coherence, and the
interested reader would do best by consulting the epistemology literature rather than
the legal literature. But seeJoseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273
(1992) (providing an illuminating treatment of the topic). There are well-known
problems with coherentist accounts ofjustified belief, but our concern here is with
the narrower problem of mixing a coherentist account of justified belief with a
metaphysical realist picture of legal facts.
13
Suppose the required coherence includes coherence among our predictive
beliefs (e.g., water will boil at 100 degrees centigrade) and our beliefs based on
subsequent experience (e.g., water did in fact boil at 100 degrees centrigrade). Will
not this sort of coherence warrant the inference that our predictive beliefs described
the world as it really is? Although this strategy might seem completely inapposite in
the legal case, it may seem to harmonize coherentism and metaphysical realism in
other domains. We do not take up this strategy of argument here, except to note
that it is parasitic on what is known as the explanatory argument for realism. For
powerful criticisms of this underlying explanatory argument, see Arthur Fine, The

NaturalOntologicalAttitude, in SCiENTIFIC REALISM 83, 84-91 (Jarrett Leplin ed., 1984)
(discussing inherent flaws to various methodological defenses of realism); Peter
Railton, ExplanationandMetaphysical Controversy, in SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 220,22430 (Philip Kitcher &Wesley C. Salmon eds., 1989); BAs C. VAN FRAASSEN, LAWS AND
SYMMETRY

142-49 (1989).
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Our objection here is not to strong objectivity about legal facts
per se. Rather, it is an objection to mating strong objectivity with
coherence theories of justified belief as a satisfactory account of
how judges can have access to strongly objective legal facts (which,
on the view under consideration, is a precondition for legal
authority). In areas outside of law, the vast majority of contempo3 2
rary metaphysical realists are "externalists" in epistemology.1
Externalism holds that beliefs are justified provided they result from
a reliable causal mechanism; that is, if the fact of which one claims
to have knowledge causes one to have the beliefs one has in a
suitable way, then one's beliefs arejustified. Coherence has nothing
to do with the justification of beliefs on an externalist account; the
right kind of causal relationship between fact and belief is all that
is required for a belief to bejustified. Externalism is not subject to
the same criticisms we have levelled against coherence accounts
because externalism requires a mechanism (causation) through
which the way the world is connected to justified beliefs so that the
set of those beliefs tracks this world. Justified beliefs are caused (in
an appropriate and reliable way) by those facts.
If externalism solves the mechanism problem that haunts
coherentism, why would a metaphysical realist about legal facts not
simply abandon coherentist accounts of justified belief about legal
facts in favor of some form of externalism? Fortunately, we can
answer this question without getting into the details of various
forms of externalism. In fact, pursuing the externalist approach
may well prove fruitful in a variety of domains, 3' but there is
good reason for being troubled by its application to legal knowledge. The problem is that externalism rejects the doxastic requirement of justified belief....
One's beliefs are justified externally,
that is, independent of one's own experience or awareness of them
as being justified. And such an account, even if plausible in other
areas of knowledge, seems especially inappropriate to the adjudica...
See, e.g., Richard Boyd, How to Be a MoralRealist,in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM
181,181-228 (G. Sayre-McCord ed., 1988) (exploring how realist philosophy of science
can be employed in the articulation and defense of moral realism); Peter Railton,
Moral Realism, 95 PHIL. REv. 163, 166-71 (1986) (arguing that a naturalistic realist
view of epistemology requires the adoption of external criteria). Perhaps the leading

contemporary externalist is Alvin Goldman. For his original articulation of the view,
see Alvin I. Goldman, A CausalTheory of Knowing, 64J. PHIL. 357 (1967).
's3 For some general doubts about externalism, however, see BONJOUR, supranote
129, at 41-45.
134 For a discussion of the doxastic requirement, see id. at 101-06.
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tory process. A judge sees herself as being justified in defending a
particular outcome as required by law by considering the grounds
for her judgment. It is an entirely self-conscious activity. Externalism requires only a suitable causal mechanism, of which the agent
need not be aware. And this seems terribly out of place in the
context of adjudication in which the justification of belief has
everything to do with the judge's self-conscious reasoning.
The realist is on to something in claiming that the ordinary
conception of adjudication seems committed to the idea that judges
try to determine what the law requires-that, in effect, judges find
the law, rather than make it in the sense subjectivism claims they
must. The problem is that if the law judges find is epistemically
transcendent-if its existence and character are independent of how
judges and others regard it-then how can judges come to hold true
beliefs about its requirements? Coherence among a set of beliefs
about what the law requires simply will not do the trick.
2. Problems with Minimal Objectivity
With this discussion in mind, it is easy to understand the
attraction of minimal objectivity. According to minimal objectivity,
legal facts are fixed by what the majority ofjudges take them to be.
Thus, there is no problem of epistemic access. Indeed, the very
concept of minimal objectivity is defined in epistemic terms, in
terms .of how the relevant community takes things to be. Though
legal discourse may appear to implicate strongly objective legal
facts, the objects of that discourse, legal facts, are only minimally
objective.
Minimal objectivity is not unproblematic, however. There are
at least three different kinds of objections that have been offered to
minimal objectivity both as a semantic and metaphysical theory.
The first concerns its difficulty in explaining the possibility of global
or large-scale error; the second concerns its inability to explain
rational disagreement that is not settled by convention; the third
concerns what we will call the problem of the dominant ideology.
We begin with the last, not because it is the most telling or
troublesome, but because versions of it are so fashionable.
Recall that liberalism's critics mistakenly argue that
Kripkenstein-like considerations establish a radical indeterminacy of
meaning when in fact that meaning is fixed by conventional human
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practices.'3 5 The human practices that fix meaning, one might
worry, are, like other human practices, reflections of the dominant
hierarchies and power relationships within the community. And
this invites the objection that ultimately the meaning of the various
rules and principles that comprise the law will reflect the dominant
culture in ways that threaten the law's legitimacy as an arbiter
among conflicting interests and conceptions of the good. The law
is really no more than an enforcer of the dominant ideology and
culture hiding behind a mask of objectivity. This is the semantic
version of the dominant ideology objection.
The metaphysical version has an even greater initial force. If
legal facts are fixed by the practices of judges, then legal facts will
reflect how judges regard them. Judges are generally well-to-do,
white males. Thus, what we regard as objective legal facts turn out
to be nothing more than expressions of the biases of wealthy, white
men.
These objections are of differing merit. The semantic version
of the objection, to start, is simply confused and implausible. That
communal practices fix the meaning of particular words and
sentences can hardly preclude those meaningful words and
sentences from being employed in new ways to express new
semantic content. The sentences "workers are exploited under
capitalism" and "in patriarchal societies, men on average enjoy
benefits and privileges not enjoyed on average by women" are
perfectly intelligible, even if semantic conventionalism is true."'
The writings of Marxists, Crits, or Feminists seem perfectly intelligible, Kripkenstein notwithstanding.
The objection to metaphysical conventionalism is slightly more
worrisome. There are good grounds for expecting some correlations between race, gender, and class and ideology or system of
belief1 7 But the correlation is neither obvious nor uniform; and
in the legal case, it surely requires some detailed explication to
See supra part I.A.3. Meaning so determined can still be quite determinate.
See infra text accompanying note 139 (discussing a more serious worry about

conventionalism as a theory of legal semantics).
17 Of race, gender, and class, class affiliations seem the most powerful predictors
and determinants of ideology, though race and gender have been more popular topics
for bourgeois academics in American law schools and elsewhere. Greater subtlety in
the application of these categories would be welcome in all cases. Most great radical
theorists, after all, came from the bourgeois classes; and need we remark upon the
pertinent racial differences between William Brennan, a jurist possessed of
exceptional powers of empathy and imagination, and Clarence Thomas, ajurist of
equally exceptional callousness and narrowness of vision?
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demonstrate that there is a real determination relation between
judicial race, gender, and class and the metaphysical universe of
legal facts. Surely, too, it is worth remembering in this context the
lesson of the "sociological" wing of Legal Realism (the Karl
Llewellyn/Underhill Moore wing): 5 8 of the psychosocial facts
about judges that explain and determine what they do, significant
weight must be assigned to the fact that they are socialized as judges,
rather than as journalists, pundits, revolutionaries, or psychotherapists. The sociological fact that judges are, quite strikingly, people
possessed of a self-conscious sense of themselves as judges, as
persons occupying roles with defined expectations and norms,
means that any simple-minded correlation between race, gender,
class, and legal decision may be the exception rather than the norm.
That being said, we think the worry about minimal objectivity as
an account of the metaphysical status of legal facts is a genuine one.
An "on-average," but not uniform, correlation between race, gender,
and class and legal decisions would be significant enough to raise
doubts about whether minimal objectivity could suffice as the kind
of objectivity of legal facts that would be consistent with legal
authority. Indeed, this objection provides part of the impetus for
exploring a conception of the law as modestly objective, a topic to
which we turn shortly.
Conventionalism (or minimal objectivity) as a semantic theory
confronts another problem: if conventional practice fixes the
meaning of a word, then participants in the practice cannot be
wrong in using the word as they do. This problem leads to quite
general philosophical problems, especially for concepts about which
our knowledge grows. If everyone agrees, for example, about the
meaning of "gold" or "death," then the conventional understanding
fixes the reference of gold or death. Suppose, however, that as a
result of developments in chemistry and biology, metal that was
formerly referred to as gold and states of being that were formerly
referred to as death are no longer plausibly viewed that way.
Suppose that, as a consequence, the relevant linguistic practices
change to reflect this change in the state of scientific knowledge.
Conventionalism or minimal objectivity provides a rather odd
characterization of what has transpired. Rather than saying that
previous speakers of the language were wrong, it must say instead

" See Leiter, supra note 60.
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that the meaning of the terms have changed because the properties
conventionally associated with the terms have changed.
A more plausible account, it seems, would claim that chemists
and biologists have learned more about the way things really are.
It makes more sense to say that scientific discovery warrants the
conclusion that previous speakers of the language were simply
wrong about the way things really are, not that things were one way
once, but are no longer. It makes even less sense to say that things
have changed just because the conventions adopted by language
speakers have changed. And it has seemed to those who are
persuaded by such objections that the only plausible alternative is
to reject conventionalism (or, in the language used so far, the thesis
that semantic facts are "minimally objective") in favor of some form
of semantic realism (i.e., the view that meaning is fixed by refer139
ence, and not the other way around).
There is one final problem for minimal objectivity: the problem
of rational disagreement. Suppose there is a general practice
among members of a community that has a certain reasonably welldefined boundary. Everyone, say, stops at red lights. Now suppose
someone comes onto the scene, does not know the people very well,
but wants to make the right kind of impression. She wants to do
what everyone else does. Such a person might ask herself the
following question: what must I do in order to conform my
behavior to what others do as a rule? This is just another way of
asking the question: what rule are the others following?
The conventionalist or minimal objectivist holds the view that
the normative dimension of the rule is fixed by convergent
behavior. If an agent wants to know what she must do in order to
follow the rule, then she should do what others do, or what is
conventionally understood to be what the rule requires. This means
that to the extent to which there is disagreement about what the
rule requires, there is no action the rule requires of her; and that is
because what the rule requires is fixed by convergent behavior. In
a nutshell, the problem is this: according to minimal objectivity or
conventionalism, the scope of the duty imposed by rules is set by
convergent behavior. In the absence of convergence, there is no
duty. This means, in the case of the red light, that everybody has
a duty to stop at the red light, but if people disagree about whether
one should stop in an emergency, then there is no duty to stop.

IS9

See Moore, supra note 126, at 323-28.
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This is just another way of raising a doubt about the ability of
minimal objectivity to provide a plausible account of rational
disagreement. One reason individuals may not converge on a
practice with respect to emergencies is that they disagree about
what the rule regarding stopping at red lights means. Their
convergent behavior underdetermines which rule they are following.140 They may disagree about what the rule requires, yet all
believe that the rule actually requires something. In other words,
none of them really believes that the rule requires nothing simply
because they disagree about what it requires. This is a problem for
minimal objectivity because it is understood as the claim that what
a rule requires is fixed by convergent practice. Presumably, part of
the commitment to objectivity in law is the idea that there are
objective answers to legal disputes, answers that may be connected
to judicial practices, but not absolutely fixed by them, answers that
are correct in spite of even widespread disagreement about what
41
they are.
3. Modest Objectivity
We have now surveyed some of the more troubling and more or
less familiar problems facing strong and minimal objectivity
respectively. Minimal and strong objectivity are not, however, the
only candidates for the kind of objectivity involved in adjudication;
there is an additional conception of objectivity we want to develop
which we call "modest objectivity." According to modest objectivity,
what seems right under "ideal epistemic conditions" determines
what is right.1 41 In pure Protagorean subjectivism, the individual is
the measure of all things in the very straightforward sense that if
something seems right to her, then it is right. 43 Minimal objectivity takes the judgment out of the hands of each person, so that it is
possible that a person could be wrong in asserting that something
140

X "underdetermines" Y when X does not justify only Y.

141We do not mean to suggest that conventionalists have nothing to say in

response to these objections. Andrei Marmor, for one, persuasively responds to at
least one version of the problem of mistakes. See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION
AND LEGAL THEORY 124-54 (1992). Additionally, when Coleman was a committed
conventionalist, he did not find the Dworkinian line of argument compelling. See
Coleman, supra note 80, at 139, 150.
142 We develop the content of "ideal epistemic conditions" infra part II.C.2, but
for now let us say that such conditions are those that are the best for gaining reliable
knowledge of something.
14 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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is right on the grounds that it seems right to her. Minimal
objectivity introduces the possibility of an agent's being wrong
about whether something is right without her being wrong depending in any way on any form of realism.
Modest objectivity allows the possibility that everybody could be
wrong about what a rule requires; what seems right even to
everyone about what a rule requires may not be right. Only what
seems right to individuals placed in an epistemically ideal position
determines what is right. At the same time, modest objectivity
provides a sense in which sentences can be objective that does not
depend on their truth-conditions being fully independent of our
epistemic resources and access to them. As a metaphysical theory,
it makes the existence and character of facts of various kinds
dependent on us, but not on our actual or existing beliefs and
evidence.
4. Modest Objectivity, Access, and Error
We have not yet said much about the concept of modest
objectivity other than to point out that it shares with minimal
objectivity an antirealist metaphysical stance, and that it shares with
strong objectivity the idea that the world is not necessarily just how
the majority regards it. Why prefer modest objectivity as an account
of adjudication and law? It would not make much sense to try to
develop the concept of modest objectivity with much care unless
there was some reason to believe that it would improve our
understanding of legal practice. One way to do that is to show how
modest objectivity avoids some of the problems that beset strong
and minimal objectivity.
Modest objectivity is not committed to a realist or strongly
objective metaphysics. According to modest objectivity, legal facts
are not evidence-transcendent. Legal facts are fixed by judgments
under epistemically ideal conditions. Therefore, modest objectivity
does not face the same problem that realism does in explaining how
ajudge could gain access to strongly objective facts.144

If meanings are minimally objective, then the extant convergent
practice fixes the meaning. This is what generates the problem of
mistakes, because where the practice changes (e.g., because of new
scientific discoveries about the chemical composition of gold), so
144It faces another problem, however, of showinghow adjudication approximates
or exemplifies ideal epistemic conditions. See infra part 1.C.5.

622

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 142:549

does meaning.
But this radical discontinuity-in which our
understanding of gold does not increase, but rather the subject
simply changes when we learn more about it-is avoided if we think
of meaning as being modestly objective. That is, what gold means
depends on what speakers of the language would take it to mean
under epistemically ideal conditions. For natural terms like "gold," the
ideal epistemic conditions must, of course, include relevant
scientific knowledge about gold. Thus, the meaning of the term is
fixed not by extant convergent practice, but by the convergence that
would occur under conditions of maximum scientific information.
Roughly the same considerations apply in the case of determining the prescriptive dimension of (legal) rules. A judge intent on
doing what the rule requires would not look to do what judges as a
rule do; there may be no convergence of behavior. Instead, ajudge
should try to uncover what a judge or panel of judges would do
under ideal epistemic conditions. That is, according to modest
objectivity, the scope of the duty under a rule is not fixed by
existing convergent practices, nor is it settled by what the law is
independent of anyone's beliefs about it; rather, the scope of duty
is given by the sort of convergence that would occur under ideal
conditions. Thus, ajudge who wants to know what the scope of that
(modestly objective) duty is wants to know what judges would do
under the relevant conditions. Disputes about the requirements of
a rule, then, are really best understood as disputes about what
practice judges would converge upon under ideal conditions
(conditions which presumably will include, for example, full
information and maximum rational and legal capabilities).
In short, we have reason to pursue the concept of modest
objectivity further. In doing so, we will have to say a good bit more
about its central idea, "ideal epistemic conditions," a concept that
we have relied upon above, but that we have so far left perhaps
maddeningly vague. We turn now to begin, but only begin, the
difficult task of remedying this situation.
C. The Content of Modest Objectivity
1. Objectivity as the Absence of Subjectivity
Note, first, that someone defending modest objectivity does not
have to defend it as a general metaphysics applicable to all domains.
In other words, it is possible to think strong objectivity applicable
to midsize physical objects like tables and chairs, while thinking
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modest objectivity appropriate to our concepts of the moral, social,
or legal domain.'4 5 Or one can defend modest objectivity with
respect to midsize physical objects and subjectivism or minimal
objectivity about the moral and social domains.
Second, whatever account of ideal epistemic conditions we settle
on may vary from one domain to another. What might constitute
ideal conditions for fixing the existence of scientific facts (should
these be modestly objective) may bear no relation to what counts as
ideal conditions for fixing the existence of legal or moral facts.
Third, there is at least one general theme that underlies our
conception of things as modestly objective (and that also underlies,
consequently, the specification of the relevant ideal conditions). All
the conceptions of objectivity-strong, modest, minimal-involve
severing the dependence of some entity or property from elements
of our "subjectivity," such as our beliefs, prejudices, ideologies, and
personal characteristics. Where strong objectivity seems untenable
(for whatever reason), we are drawn to modest objectivity where it
still seems important to sever at least some of the ties between the
existence and character of some object or property and our
immediate subjectivity; our existing subjective condition is more
likely to distort the object rather than to present it in its "true"
light. An attempt to specify idealized conditions so that what
"seems right" would determine what "is right" is just the attempt to
abstract away from some of these elements of our subjectivity.
Thus, modest objectivity is not objectivity in the sense of a world
whose character is independent of our epistemic tools for gaining
access to it; rather, it is objectivity that involves the substantial (but
not total) absence of subjectivity. It is an attempt to abstract away
from the kinds of subjectivity that might intercede between us and
items in the world that we conceive of as possessing some measure
of independence from our existing subjective propensities. It is not
(as we shall see shortly) a kind of objectivity that requires abstraction from all aspects of subjective human experience, however.
2. Understanding Epistemically Ideal Conditions
Take the case of color properties. Suppose, as seems likely,
that we conceive of colors as modestly objective; something is red
just in case it seems red to observers under ideal conditions. What
are those conditions? Well, observations would have to be made in

" See Leiter, supra note 113, at 194-95, 201-02.
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the light, not in darkness; the light would have to be reasonably
bright; it would have to be white light (Day-Glo would not do);
observers would require normal vision, and they would have to be
able to distinguish between colors (everything cannot appear blue
to them). But these ideal conditions are not necessarily our normal
or presently existing conditions. We do not want to say that the
color of an object is determined by however we presently take it to
be, regardless of our existing subjective condition. Hence, a need
for idealization exists.
But how do we know what the ideal conditions are? We have no
resource at this point other than our existing concept of the property
at issue; we simply "unpack" our concept of color, of how color
properties figure in our practices. If the specification of the
idealized conditions is accurate, then the claim must be that anyone
who uses color concepts otherwise (e.g., someone who claims that
something is red if it appears to be red under Day-Glo) would
simply not understand our concept of color.
Note, then, that a property can only be modestly objective when
there exists a sufficiently clear concept to "unpack." Most of us are
inclined to say, for example, that the tastiness of ice cream flavors
is not objective, precisely because we have no conception of what
the appropriate or ideal conditions are for rendering judgments
about tastiness. If chocolate seems tasty to Coleman, and vanilla
seems tasty to Leiter, there is really nothing more to be said; there
is no objective fact about which flavor is really tasty (i.e., no
conditions we could specify for fixing the tastiness of ice cream
flavors).
Moral judgments present a special, and more problematic case.
If morality is modestly objective, then we might want to say that X
is morally right only ifjudgers under appropriate conditions would
so judge it. But what are the appropriate conditions? Will they not
be contestable in important ways that cannot be resolved other than
by substantive moral argument, if they are resolvable at all? Yet
surely everyone would agree, would they not, that moral judgers
should have accurate and complete factual information, should be
impartial and free of bias, should weigh all affected interests
equally, and so on? Are not these conditions part of the concept of
morality that figures in our practices? Would not a person who was
unwilling to count these as appropriate or ideal conditions of moral
judgment be revealing herself to be someone who did not understand the concept of morality? Would she not be just like the
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person who thought that color properties should be fixed by
observation under Day-Glo?
It may be plausible to claim that these conditions of judgment
are part of our concept of morality in the same way that the
conditions of observation are part of our concept of color. But it
can only be plausible if we possess a sufficiently coherent and welldefined concept of morality (of what it means for something to be
morally right), so that there is something in the concept to unpack.
The question of whether morality is sufficiently coherent and welldefined is just one of the issues that separate moral realists from
moral antirealists. If the realist is right, then our concept of
morality hangs together sufficiently well that we can specify the
conditions under which persons would properly detect what it is we
are talking about when we are talking about the morality of an act.
When we say an act is morally incorrect we are, perhaps, just saying
something like, "It has a negative effect on aggregate well-being."
In that case, the appropriate conditions under which judgments will
fix the morality of an act will include full information about effects
upon well-being, the capacity to weigh affected interests, and
impartiality as between the well-being of different parties.
The antirealist denies all this. According to the antirealist,
sometimes when we say an act is "morally incorrect" we mean what
the utilitarian thinks it means; but other times, we mean that it "fails
to respect the dignity of persons" (or some other appropriate
Kantian surrogate). Still other times, we use the language of
morality to express other judgments in other circumstances. For
the antirealist, in short, our concept of morality does not cohere
around a group of descriptive or empirical properties (like facts
about well-being); talk about the morality of an act has an entirely
different role-not to pick out some cluster of facts, but perhaps to
1 46
express approval or to recommend or endorse an action.
3. Objectivity in Law and Morals
Properties can be modestly objective only if they are sufficiently
coherent to enable us to identify what would count as the conditions under which judgments about such properties would fix their
existence and character. We have suggested that our concept of
color is sufficiently coherent to admit of an account of it as
modestly objective. It is less clear whether the same could be said

14

See

GIBBARD, supra note

123, at 6-22.
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So, for example, is impartiality really a
of moral properties.
condition of adequate moral judgment? Can not a refined moral
sensibility include partialityto family and close friends? Is morality
really about aggregate well-being, the dignity and autonomy of
persons, or something else altogether?
If law and morality are connected in the strong sense that the
truth of legal propositions often depends on the truth of moral
judgments, then this dispute between moral realists and antirealists
can be extremely relevant to certain forms of legal theory. Some
legal theories, including all forms of substantive natural law theory,
make the truth of some moral claims part of the truth-conditions of
various legal claims. Michael Moore has dubbed this view "relationalism."' 47 For such theories, the objectivity of morality is, then, a
necessary condition of the objectivity of law. If the authority of law
depends on its objectivity, then legal authority turns on the very
possibility of the objectivity of morality. Morality must be objective
in some sense if law is. Moore, himself, defends a form of moral
realism. 4" For him, both law and morality are strongly objective.
The interesting case is Dworkin. Positivism can be understood
as the claim that the truth conditions of legal sentences typically do
not implicate the truth of moral judgments.14 9 Positivists reject
relationalism. As one of positivism's earliest and most powerful
150
critics, Dworkin accepts some version of the relational thesis.
On the other hand, unlike Moore, Dworkin (as we read him) rejects
moral realism and the strong objectivity of legal facts. For him,
legal facts are not part of the "'fabric' of the universe." 151 Both
law and morality must be objective for Dworkin, but not strongly
objective. We will argue momentarily that Dworkin is committed to
5 2
the modest objectivity of both law and morality.
The debate between moral realists and antirealists has less of a
bearing on the jurisprudential views that we hold. We are both
positivists, which means that we reject a strong interpretation of the

147

See Moore, supra note 92, at 2425.

14' See id. at 2491-533.

14' This is not quite the conception of positivism Coleman defends. See generally
Coleman, supra note 80.
15 See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 22-45.
151 DWORmN, supra note 23, at 80. Dworkin's use of this kind of rhetoric seems
to betray various confusions about the metaphysical issues. Nonetheless, it seems
correct to say that Dworkin holds a weaker view of the objectivity of morality than,
say, Moore does.
112 See infra part 1.C.7.
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relational thesis, that is, the view that the truth of legal claims is
invariably or often related to the truth of certain moral claims. The
objectivity of law is, in our view, independent of the objectivity of
morality in part because the truth conditions of legal propositions
do not entail the truth of moral claims. We are free to adopt an
antirealist view about morality, which, in fact, both of us are
inclined to do, while maintaining the view that legal facts can still
be minimally (Leiter) or modestly (Coleman) objective.' 5 Because
we are positivists, there is no real need here to pursue the question
of how morality, which seems so unlike color, could be modestly
objective; it is enough if law is.
4. Is Modest Objectivity Conventional?
We come now to a series of philosophically demanding and
important points. The objectivity of a concept (for example color,
morality, or law) presupposes a coherent practice regarding the use
of that concept. Only such practices can admit of ideal conditions
of observation or judgment. When properties can be modestly
objective, their being so depends on the existence of epistemically
ideal conditions for judgment. In the case of color properties, it is
fairly obvious what those conditions are. This will not always be the
case. Suppose there is disagreement as to what is to count as
153 It may be worth emphasizing our differences with both Moore and Dworkin.
Each of us are committed to the objectivity of law as a conceptual or normative
matter. (Being a skeptic and a Legal Realist of sorts, Leiter is somewhat less certain
about actual legal practice.) Unlike Dworkin and us, Moore is committed to law being
strongly objective. Both Dworkin and Moore accept the relational thesis, namely, the
claim that the truth conditions for legal propositions implicate the truth of moral
claims. We reject this thesis. Moore adopts strong objectivity about both law and
morals. Dworkin accepts the objectivity of law, and because he adopts the relational
thesis, he is committed to the objectivity of morality. But he rejects the strong
objectivity of both. In our view, heis committed to the modest objectivity of both.
Because we reject the relational thesis, our views about the objectivity of law and
of morals are not linked in the way they are for both Moore and Dworkin. Coleman
shares with Dworkin the conception of law as modestly, not strongly, objective. And
we both disagree with Moore and Dworkin about morality. Moore is committed to
morality being strongly objective; Dworkin is, we think, committed to law being
modestly objective; we doubt that morality is objective in either sense.
We are committed to what might be called "legal cognitivism." We are
committed to the claim that statements of the form, "it is the law in our community
that P " can be either true or false; statements about what the law requires are apt for
truth predicates. We are not committed to the idea that there are right answers to
all legal disputes. However, because we are committed to law's objectivity, we are
committed to the objectivity of the claims that there are right answers to legal
disputes.
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epistemically ideal positions. How is that disagreement to be
resolved? Is there a fact of the matter regarding what counts as
suitable constraints on observation and judgment? If so, what is its
source? The answer seems to be (as we hinted above) that what
counts as appropriate constraints on observation is given by
accepted practices within a domain of discourse. Scientists agree
that observations made only under white light are appropriate to
forming judgments about color properties, and so on; common
sense follows science in this regard. But if it is this kind of
scientific and common sense agreement that renders observation
conditions legitimate or appropriate, why, then, does not modest
objectivity merely collapse into conventionalism?
There is a difference, however, between saying that the nature
of X is determined by what the community believes about X
(conventionalism or minimal objectivity) and saying that the nature
of X is determined by what people under appropriate or ideal
conditions would believe about X. Even where what counts as an
idealization depends on our "conventional" practice (as in the case
of color concepts), the account of objectivity still obviously differs.
All the objection shows is that modest objectivity still honors the
Protagorean doctrine that "man is the measure of all things," by
relying, in this case, on our practices involving the concept to
generate the idealization. But this hardly shows that there is no
difference between minimal objectivity about color and modest
objectivity.
Two other points need to be emphasized. First, in cases like this
we have no other way of proceeding than by trying to unpack the
concepts that figure in our practices. The fact that these concepts
figure in our practices does not make the task of unpacking them
a version of conventionalism. The practices may be conventional,
but conventional practices may be committed to practice-transcendent or nonconventional concepts.
Second, it is highly misleading to claim that in explicating
concepts that are modestly objective, like color properties, the
epistemically ideal conditions are set orfixed by conventions. Those
conditions are not set or fixed at all. Instead of pointing out that
the conditions of observation appropriate to color properties are set
by convention, we should be read as trying to uncover the conditions of observation that are presupposed by the concept of color
properties. These are conditions that are part of the concept; they
are not independently set or determined. The whole question of
how epistemically ideal conditions are set or fixed misunderstands
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the inquiry. In every case of a property or fact that is potentially
modestly objective, we are looking to see if we can identify the
conditions of observation or judgment that the practices involving
that concept presuppose. When we are unable to identify a set of
such conditions, we do not fix a set arbitrarily. Rather, the failure
to uncover a set of such conditions gives us reason to doubt that the
concept in question is or can be modestly objective. So the thought
that modest objectivity collapses into conventionalism because the
conditions of judgment are fixed by convention simply misses the
point.
5. The Content of Modest Objectivity
and the Problem of Access
Legal facts are modestly objective when what is a legal fact is
what judges under ideal epistemic conditions would take that fact
to be. For example, Coleman is in fact liable for his negligence
when judges under ideal epistemic conditions would find him liable
for his negligence. In suggesting that this concept of objectivity is
implicit in our legal practice we are claiming that, among other
things, it may provide the best explanation for various features of
that practice.' 54 For example, we willingly allow the possibility
that individual judges can be mistaken about legal facts, that an
entire legal community during a particular historical period can be
mistaken about what the law is (e.g., the Court in the era of Plessy
v. Ferguson.55 ), but that what the law is does depend, at some level,
upon the judgment of lawyers. An in-principle undetectable legal
fact-of the sort whose existence is possible under strong objectivity-is, we suggest, not part of the conceptual apparatus of our legal
practice.
But now let us try to be more precise and flesh out this notion
of objectivity with some details. There is a legal fact about whether
Coleman is liable for his negligence just in case judges under ideal
conditions would find him liable. What are these conditions? Does
the concept of "law," or the "legal," cohere sufficiently well to admit
of characterization as modestly objective? Is law going to be more
like the case of "color" (in which ideal conditions seem easy to
specify) or "morality" (in which it may be impossible to specify such
conditions)?
15

We tackle this very question at length in Jules Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal
Objectivity: Minimal or Modest? (in progress) (manuscript on file with authors).

155 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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We want to suggest that law is more like color than morality in
this respect." 6 At least some of the ideal conditions for rendering
(objective) legal-as opposed to moral-judgment seem easy to
specify. The ideal judge must be:
(1) fully informed both about
(a) all relevant factual information; and
(b) all authoritative legal sources (statues, prior court decisions);
(2) fully rational, e.g., observant of the rules of logic;
(3) free of personal bias for or against either party;
(4) maximally empathetic and imaginative, where cases require,
for example, the weighing of affected interests; and
(5) conversant with and sensitive to informal cultural and social
knowledge of the sort essential to analogical reasoning, in
which differences and distinctions must be marked as "relevant" or "irrelevant."
Our claim, then, is that a legal judgment rendered under
conditions like these would fix what the law is on that point.'5 7
The idea that a legal judgment rendered under these conditions
would not fix the law on that point is, if modest objectivity is
correct as an account of the metaphysics of legal facts, foreign to
our legal practice. Conversely, the idea that a legal judgment
rendered under ordinary conditions (of incomplete information,
bias, irrationality, etc.) fixes the legal fact in the case at hand is, if
modest objectivity is correct, also foreign to legal practice. What
judges believe matters, even though all judges can at present be
wrong about the law. Butjudges under ideal conditions of the sort
just specified cannot be wrong.
But now comes the "natural" objection: surely, judges in the
real world are not, in fact, rendering judgments under ideal
conditions! So framed, however, this is no objection to the position
just described because our claim here is only that the appropriate
concept of objectivity in law is that of modest objectivity. The claim
is not that actual adjudication is necessarily objective in the
metaphysical sense of reliably reporting objective legal facts.
Modest objectivity is a normative conception of objectivity in the
156 Though it should go without saying, the ideal conditions for rendering color

judgments are nothing like the ideal conditions for rendering legal judgments.
'5 We are definitely not claiming that judgment under these conditions would
always identify one legal fact; since we accept that law can be indeterminate, legal
judgment under ideal conditions will sometimes identify no legal fact of the matter.
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sense that it provides a criterion for assessing whether adjudication
is legitimate or justifiable. The critic of liberalism who faults
adjudication for not being objective is precisely in need of an
account of the concept of objectivity appropriate in law to which
actual adjudication falls short. Modest objectivity provides criteria
by which to criticize actual adjudicatory practice as falling short of
objectivity, e.g., for its lack of impartiality, complete information,
imaginative empathy, logic, etc.
Having said this, the natural objection just rehearsed points to
a far more important philosophical difficulty with the theory of
modest objectivity. Recall that modest objectivity was presented
earlier as an objection to strong objectivity in that it rendered legal
facts in-principle inaccessible to judges at the very same time
accessibility was thought to be a condition of legal authority. And
if real judges are not ideal judges, and if law is modestly objective
in the sense just described, then will it not turn out that legal facts
are equally inaccessible to actual judges rendering decisions for
actual litigants?158 If that is so, will not a conception of law as
modestly objective run afoul of the very same objection we levelled
against strong objectivity, and in so doing undermine the conditions
for legal authority?
Once again, we have to be careful not to conflate two distinct
notions; let us call them "de jure inaccessibility" and "de facto
inaccessibility." According to strong objectivity, legal facts are de
jure inaccessible because, given the terms of the theory, it must be
the case that what we are capable of determining does not determine what is the case. 59 By contrast, modestly objective legal
facts will only be de jure inaccessible if the ideal conditions
specified by the theory are themselves de jure (that is, in principle
or by the terms of the theory) unattainable by humans. The ideal
conditions for rendering legal judgment, however, do not seem to
be beyond human reach; indeed, it seems that judges sometimes
approximate them well enough to succeed in reporting legal facts
(as in any standard "easy case"). As framed, the objection shows
only that legal facts are sometimes de facto inaccessible, that is,

unknown (or undetected), because of the failure of judges to be
objective in precisely the sense specified by the criteria for the ideal
158

Compare the "Normativity Argument" in Leiter, supra note 113, at 207-08.

159 This does not entail the view that dejure inaccessible legal facts are unknow-

able to humans, however, only that their being legal facts does not depend on their
being knowable.
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conditions. Modestly objective legal facts-unlike strongly objective
ones-are dejure, or in-principle accessible, and thus can survive the
earlier objection that the conditions of objectivity ultimately
undermine rather than support the liberal conception of legal
authority.
6. Modest Objectivity and Contemporary Jurisprudence
As it is normally conceived, the debate about objectivity in law
is a debate between conventionalists and realists. We have tried to
show that there is an alternative conception of objectivity, modest
objectivity, that explains the possibility of general mistake and
provides a sense of objective legal duty that extends beyond
convergent behavior, and does so without commitment to full blown
realism about legal facts. It is our view not only that this is a
coherent conception of objectivity, but also that it is the conception
of objectivity at work in much of the current jurisprudential debate.
It is, we suggest, the conception of objectivity to which Dworkin is
committed, and to which Critical Race Theorists (and also Feminists) ought to be committed. In the closing Sections of this Article,
we seek to make good on these claims. Our remarks are tentative
in part because Dworkin, and Critical Race Theorists, can be
understood as explicitly rejecting the notion of objectivity in
law.160 But we cannot allow their explicit rejection of objectivity
to divert us from showing that there is a viable form of objectivity
in the legal domain to which they could and should be committed.
160Anyone who believes that there are right answers to legal disputes is
unavoidably committed to the idea of objectivity. Thus, despite his protestations to
the contrary, Dworkin is certainly committed to metaphysically objective legal facts.
Similar remarks apply to many of his most ardent critics. See supra note 2. Much
writing by Feminists and Critical Race Theorists, on the other hand, seems to have
fallen under the influence of a lot of bad philosophy, with the result that such writers
often seem to believe that there are no objective facts about the world. Rather than
providing new perspectives (female, minority) that enrich our understanding of an
objective world or offering new discursive modes (e.g., narrative) for accessing
heretofore ignored facts about this objective world, these critical writers often seem
to view themselves as offering simple alternatives to the "white male" perspective (if
there is such a thing), alternatives that may have ethical and aesthetic merits, but
certainly no epistemic merits (like being true). We urge that these writers should not
be so quick to abandon claims to objectivity. It seems a distinct advantage to be able
to reject sexist and racist views not simply because they are ethically or aesthetically
unappealing to our "perspective" but because they are objectively false, i.e.,
predicated on false claims about gender, race, social structure, and social causation.
We suggest in the text an account of objectivity that is compatible with the spirit of
such critical work.
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7. Dworkin and Modest Objectivity
It is plain that Dworkin means to reject conventionalism and
plausible (if less plain) that he wants to resist the strong objectivity
of realism. He wants to give an account of the way in which legal
propositions can be true without their truth-conditions being set
either by convention or by correspondence to facts that are part of
"the 'fabric' of the universe."161 Although he does not explicitly
embrace a legal metaphysics, we want to suggest that the metaphysics to which he is committed is what we have called modest
objectivity, at least with regard to the status of "right
16 2
answers."
There is a difference between Dworkin's right answer thesis as
presented in his discussion of "Hard Cases," 163 and the argument
Dworkin settles on in Law's Empire."M In his earliest essays, e.g.,
"Judicial Discretion" 16 and "Model of Rules," 166 Dworkin's target was legal positivism's commitment to judicial discretion in hard
cases. At first, it looked like Dworkin's main point was that
positivism had too impoverished a conception of binding legal
standards. Increase the set of binding legal standards, and the
scope or extent of judicial discretion will diminish accordingly. By
the time one reaches his chapter on "Hard Cases," Dworkin should
be read as developing a general theory of adjudication, applicable
to all cases, and not just to hard ones. In the account developed
there, right answers to legal disputes were defined as those to which
Dworkin's idealized judge, Hercules, would come.1 67 Hercules's
judgment fixes what counts as a right answer to a legal dispute.
Thus, the kind of objectivity involved in the right answer thesis is
not independent of epistemic access to legal facts. Indeed, Hercules
is nothing other than ajudge perched precisely in an ideal epistemic
condition. He has the entirety of the law before him. He is fully
161

DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 80.

' 62 This may also be Kent Greenawalt's view. See KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND

OBJECTIVITY 210 (1992); cf. Leiter, supra note 113, at 198-200.
163 DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 81-130.
1

6 See DWORKIN, supra note 23.

6

See Dworkin,JudicialDiscretion, supra note 27, at 624 (arguing that the view of
discretion that is "grounded on the realization that some of the reasons courts give
"

for decisions do not operate like rules is inaccurate and misleading").
6
" Id. at 31 (critically assessing the positivist acceptance ofjudicial discretion in

hard cases when other

principles exist to guide and bind judges).
See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 105-30 (outlining Hercules's decision-making
process).
167
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rational and informed. He has maximum capacities for philosophical and moral reflection. The kind of objectivity exhibited by legal
facts on this account is modest.
Under the theory of "Hard Cases," judges have a duty to aspire
to decide cases as would Hercules so that they might develop a
practice that enables them to find the right answers to legal
disputes.
By the time we get to Law's Empire, Dworkin's argument has
changed significantly, even if his basic philosophical (especially
metaphysical) commitments have not. He is still committed to the
existence of right answers that are, jn our terms, modestly objective,
and this is because answers are correct if they are the decisions
reached by Hercules. The argument for judges aspiring to decide
cases as would Hercules has altered significantly, however. The
relevant components of the theory of adjudication are not defended
because they are essential to fixing or finding correct answers to
legal disputes. Rather, they are defended on different grounds of
political morality. The relevant theory of adjudication is defended
on the grounds that it embodies the political virtues of integrity,
justice, and due process.'6 8 Hercules's decision-making process
embodies these ideals, and judges should aspire to Herculean
heights, not because doing so is necessary to secure right answers,
but because doing so is required by these political ideals. 169 These
political ideals are themselves defended in terms of a theory of
political community, which is itself defended by its relationship to
the value of fraternity.'
Whereas the argument for the right
answer thesis of "Hard Cases" derives ultimately from a liberal
political theory that takes individual rights as fundamental, the
argument of Law's Empire is grounded in the ideal of liberal
community.
Whatever the differences may be between the underlying
political morality of Taking Rights Seriously and Law's Empire, and
they are substantial, Dworkin remains committed to a conception of
right answers to legal disputes: answers that can be right whatever
the prevailing conventions among lawyers may be, answers that can
be right without their correctness requiring strong objectivity, and
answers that are right and modestly objective.

168

See DwoRKiN, supra note 23, at

"I See id. at 176-216.
170
See id. at 187.

225.
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8. Critical Race Theory and Modest Objectivity
We conclude with a few brief remarks about the relationship
between critical race theories and modest objectivity. We begin by
revisiting a remark made earlier about the sense in which modest
objectivity seeks to abstract from those aspects of subjective human
experience that might infect judgment.
While it is true that objectivity suggests the rejection of
subjectivity, it is not true that the epistemically preferred position
will always abstract from aspects of subjective experience. Quite
generally, insofar as there are objective facts about subjective
experience, ideal conditions for rendering judgments about these
facts will necessarily incorporate aspects of subjective experience.
More particularly, insofar as the application of some legal categories
requires the weighing of the affected interests of individuals, then
the ideal conditions for rendering judgments about such matters
will require information about subjective experience.
In this light, the familiar emphasis in Critical Race Theory on
"narrative" can be understood not as a rejection of objectivity-"it's
narrative all the way down"-but rather as a specification of the
conditions for detecting objective legal facts in certain types of
cases.17 1 Narratives, after all, are supposed to recount subjective
experience, typically of oppression by law or by other means. They
are best understood as providing access to real facts about oppression that would be inaccessible to ordinary discursive modes of legal
reasoning. In cases, then, where minority interests are at stake (are
to be "weighed," "balanced," etc.), the claim that the legal facts are
modestly objective amounts to the claim that the ideal conditions
for rendering judgment include access to narrative depictions of the
affected parties.
It probably goes without saying, but it might bear repeating
nonetheless, that subjectivism is not the friend of those who view
themselves as alienated and disempowered.
The claim that
everything comes down to power cannot help those who view
themselves as outside the corridors of power. The kind of account
of legal facts that is compatible both with the possibility of their
objectivity as well as the centrality of narrative is, we suggest,
modest objectivity.

' See supra note 2.
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CONCLUSION

Philosophical theses are offered to help us understand and, on
occasion, to defend our practices. Liberalism is offered as an
account of a defensible political and legal practice. Its critics have
raised a variety of objections to liberalism both as an account of our
existing practices and as an ideal to which social and political
arrangements ought to aspire. Our ambition has not been to
defend liberalism against all of the criticisms levelled against it.
Instead, we have focused on two different, but related objections to
liberalism as a family of jurisprudential theses: the claims that law
is both indeterminate and subjective.
Our argument has been that liberalism is not in fact committed
to legal determinacy. Instead, it is committed to a variety of
political ideals, including the claims that political coercion must be
justified, individuals must have an opportunity to conform their
behavior to the law's demands, institutions must enhance autonomy
and well-being, and democratic rule must be possible. None of
these entail a commitment to determinacy in the sense of uniquely
warranted outcomes.
Determinacy is not part of the liberal
conception of law. Objectivity is.
For some, objectivity is not metaphysical, but procedural or
(broadly speaking) epistemic; it is motivated by commitment to
certain values that themselves do not depend on the truth of any
metaphysical claims. For reasons similar to the onesJoseph Raz has
raised against political liberalism without metaphysics, 172 we have
chosen not to pursue this approach to the concept of objectivity
implicated by law. Instead, we have pursued a metaphysical
conception of objectivity. In so doing, we have distinguished among
a variety of conceptions of objectivity and have tried to set out a
new conception of objectivity for the field ofjurisprudence, modest
17 3
objectivity.
1

" See Joseph Raz, FacingDiversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. &

PUB. AFF. 3, 4 (1990) (challenging the cogency of the reasons offered by John Rawls
and Thomas Nagel for epistemic abstinence).
1' When we say "new," we do not mean to say that this conception of objectivity
is original to us-although we believe its application to the legal domain is lacking in
philosophical pedigree. For a general metaphysical picture of modest objectivity, see
HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 49-74 (1981). For an account of value

as modestly objective, see Bruce Brower, DispositionalEthicalRealim, 103 ETHIcS 221,
222 (1993) and MarkJohnston, DispositionalTheories of Value, 63 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
Soc'x 134, 145 (1989).
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In setting out the concept of modest objectivity, we have tried
to put some flesh on its bones, establish its coherence, and explore
its relationship to both minimal and strong objectivity. We have
outlined some of the ways in which modest objectivity answers
important objections raised against both minimal and strong
objectivity. We have also argued that the notion of "ideal epistemic
conditions" is central to much of the currentjurisprudential debate,
figuring prominently in both Dworkin's and his strongest critics'
most important arguments. To that extent, we have suggested that
(implicitly at least) the thought that law is modestly objective is part
of the working conception of legal practice among many different
jurisprudential theses.
Much work remains. We have not completely fleshed out the
idea of "ideal epistemic conditions" as applied to law. We have not
yet shown that our working conception of law is sufficiently
coherent to admit of (metaphysical) objectivity of any sort. In short,
it remains for us to show that modest objectivity figures not only in
the various jurisprudential accounts of legal practice, but also in our
legal practices themselves. That is a formidable task, one on which
we differ, and which we hope to explore shortly. For now, we have
to be satisfied with putting the concept of modest objectivity on the
table.
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" Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the Tel Aviv Conference on
"Interpretation" where it benefitted from excellent comments by Andrei Marmor,
Joseph Raz,Jeremy Waldron, and Michael Moore and at Oxford University where it
benefitted from more comments by Raz and Waldron, a splendid commentary by
Howard Chang, and thoughtful criticisms by Ruth Chang, Will Woluchow, John
Finnis,John Gardner, Carl Wellman, and Liam Murphy. The Article also improved
as a result of conversations with Peter Railton, Larry Alexander, Chris Kutz, Scott
Shapiro, and Jack Balkin.
This Article is part of a series of papers on objectivity in law by the authors.
Some in the series will be coauthored, others will not. The reader is directed to
Leiter, supra notes 20, 60, 113, and to Jules Coleman's book-length manuscript,
Reason, Objectivity and Authority (in progress) (manuscript on file with author), for
related discussions of the materials in this Article. In the next,jointly authored piece,
we plan to take up the question of whether legal facts are minimally or modestly
objective. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 154.

